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INTRODUCTION
#
Starting with its first issue (November 7, 1914,
shortly after the outbreaK of World War One), THE NEW REPUBLIC
for many years carried on its cover a self -description - "A
Journal of Opinion." As a journal of opinion, the magazine has
always been a leader of thought amon^ that group of American
intellectuals called "liberals," although its circulation has
never been high as magazine circulations go. THE NEW REPUBLIC
has printed articles by most of the progressive leaders and
thinkers of the nation, and the magazine's own editors have
ranked high among the liberals. There was the first editor,
Herbert Croly, with his "Promise of American Life," a philosophy
which still guides the magazine today. There were also George
Soule and Bruce Bliven, critics Edmund Wilson, Stark Young, and
Malcolm Cowley, and young pundit Walter Lippman. In the most
recent period there was the brief reign of Henry Wallace, which
lasted until young editor Wiichael Straight took the magazine
back to its traditional position just to the right of the ex-
treme Left-wing.
tudes of this liberal "journal of opinion" toward the twc great
wars in which the united States has participated in recent his-
tory, and to see how progressive minds reacted to modern history
as it was happening. It is the intention of this work to trace
It is the pur-pose of this study to examine the atti-
•/
the steady change in attitudes which finally led the editors of
THE NEW REPUBLIC to advocate United States' entrance into World
War Cne, and then World War Two. It was felt that this study
was of value in view of current events which see American
liberals s truggling to keep the United States from plunging in-
to a third world war - one which possibly would bring with it
the destruction of modern civilization.
i/iethod
To find out just what the editors of the magazine
thought in the great crises of 1914-17 and 1939-41, the investin
gator has relied entirely upon the primary source THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC itself. And the magazine articles cnosen are those by
the editors themselves writing in their editorial capacities.
For the editors stress that signed articles do not necessarily
carry their stamp of complete approval. The magazine printed
material to which it was diametrically opposed only as letters
to the editors.
The work is composed of two main parts: World War
One and World War Two. There is also a short transition show-
ing the magazine's stand upon the vital issues growing out of
the first war which formed the basis for the conflicts which led
to the second war. These issues were the Treaty of Versailles,
the League of Nations, the Washington Conference on naval dis-
armament, the Kellq
,
-Briand pact, the Spanish Civil War - the
rehearsal for what was to come - and the United States' Neutral-
ity legislation - the nation's effort to avoid some of the
•
hi stakes of 1914-1917.
The material on World War One shows the magazine's
reaction to German mill tarism, infringements on neutral rights
by both Germany and Britain, submarine warfare, hopes for tire
postwar world, and the decision to urge the nation zc fiznt.
TE2 SHEW h'^PUBLIC 1 s attitude toward Fascism, German
aggression, Japan, the des troyers-for-oases deal, lend-lease,
and fears of a pcsL-war world dominated by Nazi Germany, will
be shewn as factors leading to the magazine's interventionist
stand in World War Twc
.
'The chronological method has been used in this thesis
in order to present a whole picture of the development of atti-
tudes towards several issues at the same time.
•
CHAPTER I
WORLD WAP ONE
TKE NEW REPUBLIC'S attitude toward the question of
American participation in World War One changed radically be-
tween 1914 and 1917. The magazine's first reaction was that
although American isolation was ended and Americans should be
interested in seeing that a stable peace resulted from the bat-
tle, yet it was fcclish to bill the conflict as one in which
the future of civilization was at stake. The editors declared
in the first issue, "the future no more depends upon a single
t
race or nation (Britain) than a nation on a single individual."'
But before Wilson's war message to Congress in 1917, THE NSW
REPUBLIC had concluded that this was a war for neutral rights,
freedom of the seas, the future of Atlantic civilization, and
a post-war world whose security 7/ould be entrusted to a "League
to Enforce Peace." It is the task of this first chapter to
show the steps which led to the magazine's decision that the
United States ou-'^Lt tc declare war on Germany.
End of Isolation
(
The first issue hailed the end of American isolation
and affirmed the nation's interest in the future peace treaty:
"If the treaty is one whicn makes for international stability
and justice, this country will have an interest in maintaining
it." And conversely, the United States should work for the
•
revision of any treaty which spelled a victory for militarism.
While asserting than the country should not enter the
war, TEE NEW REPUBLIC early criticized the government for not
throwing its strongest diplomatic pressure against the German
invaders of Belgium so that the peoples of tne world would know
that the united States was a moral forc6 with which to reckon.
As a timid neutral, the editors felt, the United States would
cut a sorry 'figure at. the postwar peace settlement. It was
argued that the cause of world organization needed the backing
4
of a morally purposeful major power.
x
Jacificism
Judging by an editorial entitled "Pacifism vs.
Passivism" the magazine did not feel that a clear case had been
made out for a charge of war guilt against Germany. This edi-
torial criticized passivism as laissez faire which made it easy
for militarism. To be preferred was the newer ideal in which
peace 7/as to be actively and intentionally promoted. The
editors declared,
"A modern nation which wants the world
to live in peace should not be content
to keep the peace Itself. It must be
willing and ready, whenever a clear case
can be made cut against a disturber of
the peace, tc join with other nations in
taking up arms against the malefactor *• -
League of Peace
This new pacifist ideal was carried further in a 1915
article which urged peaceful powers to organize peace as belli-
gerents did war. It was declared essential that the approval
••
or disapproval of pacific powers be -rade a factor in the calcu-
lations of warring nations. The editors argued that Germany
dared bo invade Belgium because it was decided that violating
Belgian neutrality carried a larger military advantage than did
respecting it. And TEE NEW REPUBLIC concluded,
, "If other neutral powers had been ready
to fight for Belgium, German calculations
would have had a different result . The
only way in which neutral interests can
obtain weight in the counsel of nations
commensurate with their real importance
is by means of a league organized ex-
'pressly for their ^promotion and assertion
in time of need." 0
This appeal for a league of peace was to become the
war cry of THE NSW REPUBLIC. And the ideal was to be promoted
in aLmost every issue of the war years.
In the spring of 1915 THE NEW REPUBLIC expanded on
its frequent suggestions favoring the establishment of a League
of Peace. It was stated that the Allies should serve as the
beginning of League membership, with the United States backing
up the Allies. The main difference between the League and the
current alliance would be the duty of arbitration and mediation
of disputes, with a public constitution. The League would pro-
vide security for France and make unnecessary the French alli-
ance with Russia. The magazine felt tha'c official Russia still
belonged to the dark ages.
The base of the League would be as broad as possible;
Germany and Austria would be welcome. The reluctance of the
Central Powers to join the League at the start was recognized

as a weakness, out one which could be overcome.
THE NEW REPUBLIC was fully aware that the basic weak-
ness of the League would be the refusal of any sbate to abandon
any of its sovereignty. Per a true League of Peace must have
7
the power to supervise tne foreign policies of its members.
Neutral Rights
That spring the magazine book up a new issue, that of
lav/ and order on the high seas . And there were sharp words for
the British as well as the Germans. Great Britain was criti-
cized for failure to live up bo its international obligations in
conducting its blockade of Germany. THE NEW REPUBLIC pointed
out that Britain, as the preponderant sea power, held the power
of life and death over nations which lived by international
trade. Neutrals were urged bo insist upon the sanctity of the
traditional belligerent obligations to neutrals. This would at
Qleast preserve their standing In court.
Meanwhile, Germany was cautioned do avoid arousing
the wratn of the United States by her submarine warfare. The
magazine reiterated its opposition to declaring war against
Germany, but pointed cut that its pro-Ally sentiment was typical]
of the whole American nation. And Germany was warned that if
more innocent people were killed and neutral ships torpedoed,
American anger might be all the more terrible because it had
been so long suppressed by a desire to maintain neutrality.
Lusi tania
9
To THE NEW REPUBLIC the sinking of the Lusitania
i»
emphasized the dependence of the United States on British mari-
time supremacy. It appeared that if German submarines should
render British sea power ineffective, disaster would result not
only to the Empire but to American trade.
However, the magazine confirmed Germany's right to
sink ships carrying contraband, out insisted that despite the
difficulties presented by the limitations on submarines, caused
by their nature, no snips should be sunk until warning had been
given and the safety of passengers and crew assured,.
The editors declared a war with Germany would be a
calamity for the United States. The United States would win,
but there would be moral damage., including racial cleavage.
At the same time, the magazine took the opportunity
to criticize again British encroachments on shipping. It was
admitted that Germany was acting barbarously, but Britain was
using the same argument that military necessity warranted the
breaking of international law. The phrase "A plague on both
your houses" would sum up the magazine's attitude, and the Unit-
ed. States government was praised for the firmness end finality
with which it had resisted the attempt of both belligerents to
write their own national policies and interests into public law^
The next week, the editors reached the conclusion that
Germany had a just grievance against international law which
made it so difficult for her to break the British blockade with-
out offendin- neutrals. The editors declared the German claim
of military necessity was very real since the flow of American

arms tc Britain might win the war for the Allies, and civilians
should not be insurance for vessels carrying war goods. At the
same time it was almost impossible for the Germans to get these
arms fcr themselves due to British sea power. However, the
editors maintained that German butchery had corrupted their sub-p
stantial claim against international law.
And the editors repudiated the idea that the United .
States should voluntarily surrender the right of its citizens to
sell munitions to the Allies. International law should not be
written during the heat and confusion of actual hostilities* ^
Later, the magazine was tc declare, "The German Go-
vernment planned with utmost premeditation to kill one hundred
inoffensive American citizens who were behaving as they had a
12
moral and legal right tc behave." Germany was cautioned that
American public opinion condemned it as criminal and some day
that opinion would count.
A series of articles in the summer of 1915 pointed out
that the sinking of the Lusitania bared the imminent clash be-
tween American and German interests. The German note in reply
tc the American note of protest was not well received in the
United States. Many Americans called fcr a break in diplomatic
relations, and a strong minority who felt that the Allies were
fighting our war clamored for American intervention.
In June of 1915, TEE NEW REPUBLIC addressed itself to
that strong pro-Allied minority. The editors agreed with much
of their attitude. They agreed the cause fcr which the Allies

7had begun fighting ten months before was, on the whole, a good
cause. The invasion of Belgium proved Germany to be an aggres-
sor, and the United States must not shun its responsibilities.
Yet, the editors remained firm. The nation must not
abandon its traditional neutrality. And if the country should
be forced into war by Germany, the challenge would be accepted
with extreme reluctance.
American Participation
As long as the Allies were in danger of being over-
whelmed, then, it was felt, American participation in the war
might be proper. But, the editors were convinced that although
Germany might hold off the Allies, she could not defeat them.
Instead, the editors were concerned with the fear that if the
Allies crushed Germany, there could not be a just and lasting
peace settlement. Europe would be carved up to suit Allied im-
perialism rather than the interests of democracy. And American
power on the side of the Allies would mean the crushing defeat
of Germany,
TEE NEW REPUBLIC believed the price for a decisive
American influence upon the peace negotiations would be too high
Decisive influence would go to the nation which had sacrificed
greatly for the cause and still possessed military strength.
The United States was not prepared to lose a million men in or-
der to have a sav about the disposition of Trieste and Constan-
tinople. As a result, American influence would count as much as
a neutral as it would as a belligerent which had contributed
4
8money and supplies but not human lives. Besides, there ought
to be one disinterested great power at the peace table. THE
NEW REPUBLIC nominated the United States for the role.
That spring congressional debate oegan on the question
of a national defense budget, and THE NEW REPUBLIC came out in
favor of a moderate increase in the armed forces and immediately
had to defend itself against charges of militarism made by some
liberals. The magazine pointed out a lesson of history that un-
preparedness never had prevented the nation from plunging into
war. At the same time, Switzerland was used as the model of a
nation which was known to be pacific yet was well armed. The
intelligent pacifist was defined as one who set himself the
task of finding answers to international problems, of develop-
ing the peaceful organization of the world, and of removing the
causes of aggression, kna the magazine advised the pacifist to
begin at home, using Pan-Americanism as the opportunity of ac-
quiring experience in international organization. To quote the
editors, "We have littl-3 faiDli in pacifism which is mere laissez
faire, in the doctrine that peace is the vacuum created by the
14
absence of war."
In the summer the debate on national defense contin-
ued. THE NEW REPUBLIC took the debate as the occasion to re-
state its rejection of both radical pacifism and radical mili-
tarism.
"it takes two to make peace. . . tc be
non-resistant must mean, then, that one
regards nothing as unendurable, even the

loss of what one loves or admires
cr have sworn to serve and protect. 11^
The editors declared one cannot hate lawlessness and
brutality without hating those who perpetrate cr instigate them.
The proper projects for peace-loving men were disarmament and
isinternational court, and publicity for diplomatic negotiations.
As for preparedness, the magazine declared, "The lack
of military preparedness in a country like the United States in-
creases the ccst without diminishing the danger of war." It was
again argued that if provoked, no lacK of armament would prevent
the nation from declaring war.
The magazine was convinced the preparedness meant the
clear-sighted adoption of a new foreign policy to meet the new
facts of the world. And upon the basi3 of that policy, military
power should be created to uphold it. Assisting the armed forces
would be moral and economic weapons such as boycott, discriminate
ing neutrality, and other non-military pressure. Any new foreign
policy would involve an understanding with the British Empire,
the A, B, G powers of South America, and the general idea con-
tained in a league of peace. 7
Meaning of American Neutrality
Meanwhile the United Stages was, selling arms and mu-
nitions to the belligerents. Because of the British blockade,
Lt meant the 8rms were sold to Allied powers, net tc the >ermans
,
EKE NEW REPUBLIC admitted it was just as neutral tc ban the sale
Df munitions to all belligerents as it was to offer them to both
vhen it was obvious only one party had the sea power to import
5( <
10
•
them safely. But, said the" magazine, an embargo wouli be "mo-
rally and politically reprehensible . " For this would be aiding
the Germans whose obvious preparation for the war proved them -
in tne eyes of the editors - to be aggressors who had armed to
conquer, not to defend, if there were two ways of being neutral
the magazine favored the stand which would help the Allies.
However, at the same time, the editors urged the
government to continue to oppose both British and German en-
croachments on neutral riyLts. it was charged the British Or-
ders -In-Council were destroying the major achievements of in-
ternational law in the past one hundred years. Qf course the
submarine was a new weapon which was bringing terror to the
seas. But tne appearance of such a destructive weapon should
be made the occasion for striving go help neutrals, not drive
them off the sea.
Hi-I NEW REPUBLIC felt it was up to the United States
tc take the lead in working for the abandonment of the blockade.
And it was suyj-ested that both Britain and Germany would prove
amenable to the enormous economic power cf the United States.
But, the magazine believed American pressure could be asserted
effectively enough so that Britain would yield before it oecame
necessary tc use that economic power against her, since she
lived by world trade. And looking ahead, THE NSV« REPUBLIC saw
tbe Germany of the future participating more in world trade and
thus mere susceptible to pressure by neutral traders.
^
German submarines continued to sink neutral vessels,

but were careful to ^ive them full warning tc help save the
lives cf the crew. But TEE NEW REPUBLIC nervously awaited the
next inc.. dent in which a sudden strike would result in another
sea disaster. In comparing the difference between British and
German infringements upon neutral rights, the editors stated,
"She (Germany) has created a reign cf
horror upon the high seas by destroying-
innocent lives. She has net only broken
the law, as England has; she has broken
it with cruel violence. To the American
mind her sin is infinitely greater than
England's, and the clear fact of the
situation is that America, supposedly
dollar-ridden, will never judge as equal
offences the steppage of trade and the
killing of innocent people. "19
The magazine was ready to go to war tc defend American
lives. But it was decided American entrance into the conflict
would defeat American purposes. No military operation would
secure freedom cf the seas, and the United States would have to
drop its opposition tc British tactics towards neutrals.
It was acknov/led:red that the crushing of England and
France would endanger the American future and American military
intervention would be needed.
But, said the magazine,
"If we are going tc stake our future,
in the name of sanity, let us know
that we are doing it. Let us state
early with perfect clearness that we
are determined tc fight Germany not
alone on account of her submarine po-
licy, but because we fear her dominion
of the world. "20
The solution must still maintain the United States'

position as the G&ampion of neutral rights, yet furnish a way
cf acting* against Germany which at once would, condemn her while
enabling America to decline the responsibility for the imperi-
alistic policies of three of the Allies - Russia, Japan, and
21Italy. The possibility of sending troops to Europe was ruled
out since it would identify the United States with the military
policy of the Allies and prevent America from serving as media-
tor .
The editors came up with a new suggestion for American
action on the ccntraoand and blockade dispute. The United.
States should, propose that prize courts and courts cf control
should not be British out international, representing all the
neutral powers. This could be the start cf a solid world orga-
nization in which neutrals acting together could force an ag-
gressor bo yield, to their combined, economic pressure.
For America could give what none of the combatants
could give: a lead in the organization of forces which might
22lay the foundations of a new society of nations
•
But, it was stressed, the American government must
continue to pretest every instance of British misbehavior. For
only by maintaining an honest opposition to tne British blockade
would there by any validity against complaints by Germany. Neu-
trals must cling to their rights and not depend upon the good,
will of British sea power. For the seas to be free, they must
be regulated in :he interest of international security and
peace. An., the1 regulation power was too great to be entrusted

13
to any one nation.
In August of 1915, TES NEW REPUBLIC ' 3 chief editor,
Herbert Croly, famous for his philosophy of "The Promise of
American Life," wrote, in a signed article, of the meaning of
American neutrality. Ee stated chat the greatest benefit of the
war could not be a German loss of power, but a German increase
of experience. Crply declared that America owed no obligation
to the cause of liberalism unless the Western Powers should
seem in danger of being crushed, which did not appear likely.
(Later in tnis work it will be seen that this fear of the crush-
ing of Western power by Germany was the basic motive for the
magazine's interventionist attitude in World War Two.) To Croly,
•
the special problem of the allies was to make a world war con-
tribute to permanent pacification. And the special problem of
America was to make neutral abstention from war contribute to
the same end. Said Croly, "if we are forced into the war we
ought not to lose si~hb of our special work." TIe called for
limited participation if any part icipa bion were necessary.
And the United States, he argued, should not get too
involved in the peace treaty which should be determined by a
balance of forces rather than the authority of ideas. He felt
that the post-war construction period would provide America with
24its great opportunity to contribute to world stability.
Call for Break with Germany
August of 1915 was a bad month for German-American
relations. The Neif York World published letters apparently
F( *
written between German officials and American agents who were
trying to bribe labor leaders to call strikes in munitions fac-
tories. THE NEW REPUBLIC angrily called the German offense as
25
nypocritical and Drutal as the attack on Belgium.
After tne sinking of the Arabic , the magazine called
for the nation to prepare for complete non-intercourse with
Germany: steppage of mails, wireless, imports and exports. It
was urged that America should increase munitions production and
lend money tc the Allies in order to hurt Germany as much as pos-
sible. And the editors warned that the nation was being drawn
into a conflict with Germany through the incapacity of the Ger-
mans to realize the submarine campaign was against their best
interests. It was necessary to show that the United States meant
to isolate and then boycott Germany, and finally mobilize, if
submarines continued tc sink without warning. In that way Ger-
2 S
man moderates might prevail in their own government.
The magazine found the German reply to the United
States protest on the Arabic sinking to be completely unsatis-
factory. The magazine wanted President .Vilson to call back our
ambassador from Berlin and ask the Germans to send for their
envoy to Washington. The President was advised that his only
chance of securing the safety of Americans on British vessels
and of rescuing interns ti onal law from "the suffocating grip of
an unscrupulous enemy" was to make the Germans understand the
full cost of American hostility. Breaking off diplomatic rela-
tions, it was stated, would not necessarily precipitate the

country into war. If war followed it would be because Germany
chose to issue a declaration of war or had continued to kill
Americans. To THE SEW REPUBLIC this would be a war of German
aggression - and the American people v/ould rally behind their
27government
.
The magazine already had spoken out to those who
v/ould have had the nation abandon or waive the rights under in-
ternational law which were bringing the country into conflict
with Germany,
"These people wholly failed to
realize that the rights of neutrals
under the law of nations were just as
plainly the beginnings of a constitu-
tional international system as the
charter of municipal rights granted by
feudal lords were the beginning of do-
mestic constitutionalism.
"The law of visit and search,
which so many Americans would have con-
sented to abandon because of the danger
and cost of insisting on it, is an es-
sential part of the whole system of neu-
tral right s."^b
America's Future
In September of 1915 the magazine printed an article
which later will be shown to present a basic difference between
early attitudes in frcrld 7;ar One and in Vicrld War Two. In 1^15
THE KEW REPUBLIC felt that even if Germany defeated the Allies
in battle ^he future would net be so dark. For, said the maga-
zine, "The Germans realize better than any other people, that
modern military power is based upon economic power." German
victory would be followed by an energetic initiative In fields
of industry and commerce, and the formation of an alliance of

\the most militant peoples oi Europe - Germans, roles, Bulgers,
Hungarians, and Turks. But, according to THE NEW REPUBLIC,
this "victorious and invincible combination" would do nothing
about the Monroe doctrine or the British Empire. The new alli-
ance would be occupied for a generation in cultivating its own
vast exnplre. It would be truculent In tone, but with Russia on
29
hand in the east, it would not be seeking other trouble.
In October of 1915 President Wilson submitted to Con-
gress a legislative program featuring plans for increasing the
army and the navy. THE NEW REPUBLIC called this a "wise and
courageous course" and said the enlargement of the American
armed forces might bulk as one of the decisive facts in the
world history of the following fifty years. For e nation with
as formidable a navy as called for by the plans would be certair
to have increased weight in international councils. The support
of the United States would become indispensable to European na-
tions. It was stressed that tne United States was not arming to
defend itself against Germany but to back up its national pcli-
30
cies and interne tional responsibilities.
United States-Britain Alliance
Meanwhile, the magazine was considering America's
diplomatic course for future veers. It was stated that Ameri-
ca's policy of self -centered aloofness was partly responsible
for Europe's chaos. If European democracy fell, the United
States would become the last bulwark of popular government.
"For this fundamental reason, there is almost literal truth to
<»
< *
the statement thai, the Allies are fighting America's battles."
As a result, America could not he passively neutral.
To THE KB1 REPUBLIC the lexical answer was an alli-
ance between America and the British Empire, as the only two
great powers influenced by the great moral tone of public opin-
ion. The magazine declared that had the alliance existed be-
fore, there would nob have been a world War.
The next month the Allies, Britain and France, issued
the statement that Germany must be crushed in the interest of
world peace. The magazine sharply criticized the statement,
sayin? the peace must be one cf compromise. Otherwise, the
German people would see chat militarism did pay - for the vic-
tor. The harsh peace would make them loyal bo their government,
and convince them the unfavorable things said about Allied in-
32tentions were true.
Press Criticism
Luring the following weeks TEE NEW REPUBLIC was de-
fendin ; itself against two charges of pro -Germanism. The accus-
ers were The Bos ben l ranscript
,
called by the magazine "the most
pretentiously learned newspaper in the United States," and
Professor Ralph Barton Perry, of Harvard.
To the magazine It was strange that the newspaper's
remark came just three days after the magazine's appeal for an
Anglo -Ameri can alliance. It concluded that by pro-German The
Transcript meant anything short of complete pro-Allied fana-
ticism. "There are circles of Bosbon society where The T ran
-

scr ipt is approved, in whicr it is pro-Gorman (and even anti-
A-ieri-can) to doubt the smallest ite:u of the most jingoistic
utterance of the Allies." The magazine sarcastically surges ted
that perhaps it wasn't ritht to mention Allied atrocities and
air raids. And it concluded "if everything in the world is
concentrated in the cause of the Allies, then we ou?ht to be
fighting in Flanders, not making money in Boston." However, the
magazine asserted, Trie Transcript was not wixling to fight; all
it did was contribute to the Red Cross and talk about the situ-
33
aticn
.
THE Nfell ' PUBLIC concluded that what bothered Profes-
sor Perry was the magazine's refusal to hate Germany. The
editors pointed out they had fevered closer political union
with the British Empire, urged a navy larger than Germany but
smaller than Erigiarid*s, advised a guard on German ambition in
the western hemisphere, had come out against an arms embargo,
spoken in favor of a loan to England and Prance, end had casti-
gated Germany s invasion of Belgium. To the editors the moral
issue involved was whether the awful slaughter of the war was
to help towards a just and lasting peace. Trie question of war
guilt was secondary. Prance, Italy, and Japan had not entered
the war with clean hands. Tne magazine declined to be con-
vinced that ti-ey would emerge clean. And the editors left Pro-
fessor Perry with these words, "The task of reconstructing the
world is so infinitely difficult that consuming hatred seems to
us a luxury. It is bhe refuge of those too angry to think. 11
I
Shortly before this article, the magazine had de-
clared its opinion that the American people did not intend to
take part in the war. But since America had no intention of
becoming a belligerent, she ought not to talk and think like
cne . If inactivity was palling Americans, there was plenty of
activity they could have as neutrals. Americans should take
over the relief operations in Europe and should be a clearing
house of act and opinion. But most of all, America should be
standing against the inanity of hate, "the insanity which pro-
posed to atone fcr a crime by committing more crimes." The
Allied ambition to crush Germany was seen as inimical to world
peace, and as making meaningless pretensions of concern for the
future of civilization.
Wilson
THE NEW REPUBLIC, which later was to have the highest
praise for Woodrow Wilson, was extremely critical of the Presi-
dent at this time (December, 1915) • The magazine declared,
"Wilson avoided war not through diplomacy but through luck.
Kis diplomacy consisted entirely in keeping the American people
quiet long enough for the 3ritish to invent a defense against
submarine raids." 0 And in January of 1916 the editors stated
that in the long run the timid neutrality of Wilson would lead
to war. But, they wrote, the methods advocated by Theodore
Roosevelt would lead to peace. Again, they refused to give
Wilson credit for any successful action against submarines. It
was pointed out that both 'Wilson and the former president,
TV
Roosevelt, used words. But the editors felt it was obvious
Roosevelt was not bluffing while 'Mlson was. They claimed
Roosevelt would have warned Germany before the invasion of Bel-
gium, setting a great precedent ; he also would neve warned Eng-
land about freedom of the seas.
Where Wilson's method was to wait for things to hap-
pen and then to find a solution, Roosevelt would have acted
before they happened. TEE NEI REPUBLIC called Roosevelt "a
real internationalist." The magazine said he had flung a
challenge fee pacifists: "You wish an organized world community;
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what risks are you ready bo run in order to establish it?"
The editors said it was now time for the Allies to
clarify their peace aims. German courage, it was said, was
based upon fears of Allied aims. To state them would be a
shrewd political move and would begin the education of the Ger-
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man people
.
However critical the magazine was of the use of verb-
al weapons against Germany, Vvilson's deference to Britain was
approved as perfectly adapted to the relationship existing be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom. The magazine
repeated its support of the policy of refraining from enforcing
our protests against illegal British actions cn the sea. The
editoi-s said Britain was one country a ;ainst which only "civi-
lized" methods should be used. America should call every vio-
lation of neutral rights to the attention of the British govern-
ment only for the sake of the record. I\To surrender of the
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symbol of peutral rights under international law could be made
until Americans had some assurance they were to be exchanged
for something better.
Returning to the theme of action along lines advocated
by Theodore Roosevelt, the magazine declared that Germany's
action in involving the innocent and inoffensive Belgians in
the war had made neutral indifference abhorrent to right-minded
men. The United States, it was said, would have been justified
in declaring an embargo on all trade with Germany until Belgium
was evacuated and indemnified.
But moral disapproval of Germany did not mean blanket
approval of the Allied cause. It was admitted that the past
domestic and foreign policies of England did not entitle her tc
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unlimited confidence.
Mill tarism
In the same issue (January 22, 1916), the editors
found it necessary to speak up against what it took to be the
beginning in America of the very military arrogance so abhorred
in the Germans. They said that if the American people had to
choose between the virulence of the militarists and the ideas
of the pacifists, the pacifists would, win out even at the risk
of destroying tne foundations of American policy.
"The real desire of Americans is
to make a civilization in America.
They will prepare wnat is necessary to
defend that; they may even be Induced
tc take a share in the policing of the
world. But they do not want to be told
that war is a gymnasium of the virtues;
i
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they know i t tc be the stinking thing
that it is. . .Their condemna tion of
Germany in this war is "based on what
they believe to be a dangerous military
psychology in the rulers of Germany,
and they are shrewd enough to detect
and resent the same, psychology when it
crops up in America. "40
The next month the magazine a ;&in took up its criti-
cism of President Wilson's policy. The occasion was comment
upon a speech by former Secretary cf State Elihu Root. The
editors declared that during one of the great crises In the
history cf the world, at a moment when an opportunity existed
to make the United States a positive influence on behalf of
international order, rresident Wilson had elected to remain
scrupulously neutral in word and deed, and solemnly advised
neutrality in thought and in feeling. On the other hand, the
editors stated, Root had expressed the discomfort of Americans
who had no outlet for their moral and social convictions due tc
the official policy of their country during a time of intense
emotional ferment. HIE F' \ ElEPUBJuIC declared that Slihu Root
stood for the high standard of international responsibility
wr_ich could Lave been imposed upon public opinion by a real na-
tional leader* It agreed with Root that the government's of-
ficial silence after the invasion of Belgium symbolized the
41failure of the administration's leadership.
Santayana
In return, THE NEffl REPUBLIC had criticism of itself
to answer a'gain. This time the critic was philosopher George
Santayana, a contributor to the magazine at that time.
I SSOOO
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The editors declared the United States should not en-
ter the war, and American public opinion was net under any obli-f
gabion to imitate French and British public opinion. It was
admitted that German aggression raised an international questior)
in which the United States was interested. But they said the
war was ninety per cent national and only ten per cent inter-
national. They stated,
"Some day nations may fight for a
predominantly international cause,
but they are hardly prepared to do so
yet. It is unreasonable to expect a
country with the composition, the tra-
ditions, an^ collective psychology of
ti.is United States to intervene chief-
ly on disinterested political ground
in a European war. "42
THE NEW REPUBLIC ' said that contrary to the ideas ex-
pressed by Santayana the peace settlement must not be too harsh
on Germany. The united States must net countenance the destruct
ticn of the German nation. If Britain insisted upon the crush-
ing of Germany tne United States could net go through with any
proposed political alliance with the British Empire since the
cause of world peace would have been betrayed. A strong and
contented Germany was necessary for ths concert of Europe.
"Thus," said une editors, "we differ from the pro-Ally Ameri-
cans chiefly because we do not see Prussianism as an essen-
tially malevolent political menster that will continue to vomit
jeses until it is destroyed by seme equally absolute kni -jjht-
errant." The German's had made a terrible mistake, but should
not pay for it with all their political ambitions for the
/*>
future or by being classified as criminals. The editors
could not see any advantage to the substitution in Germany of
a foreign oppression for a native one.
The Sussex
The sinking of the Sussex brought about a new crisis
betv/een the United States and Germany in April of 1916. To
THE NEW REPUBLIC the sinking showed that even with good inten-
tions on the part of civil authorities, submarine warfare could
not be conducted with regard to the safety of the noncombatant
.
The magazine called upon President Wilson to demand that Germany
abandon submarine warfare against merchant ships, under the
penalty of a break with the United States ana a threat of or-
ganized assistance to the Allies. The Germans had their chance
to show whether the submarine could be used humanely. Now they
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would give it up or fece the consequences.
On April 22, in an article titled M An Appeal to the
President," the magazine advocated a diplomatic break with
Germany and the abolishment of the doctrine of neutrality. The
editors said, "We must say that from now on the United States
is net neutral. It intends to use its moral power, its econo-
mic resources, and in some cases its military force against
the aggressor." An aggressor as defined as "the nation that
will not submit its quarrel to international inquiry, that will
not suspend action until the world has had a chance to pass
judgment upon it or that pursues its quarrel after the world
has decided against it." 45

Break wi th Germany
Ta.e magazine demanded the government announce to Ger-
many that; the United States would break off relations unless she
agreed to abandon submarine warfare against commerce, to evacu-
ate Belgium, France, and Serbia, to indemnify Belgium, and ac-
capt the principle of ccilective action against nations which
refused to submit quarrels to arbitration. If Germany accepted
this pre "ram the United States should resume intercourse and
agree not to furnish special aid bo the Allies. ^®
TEE NEVI REPUBLIC realized a break in diplomatic re-
lations could lead to war if handled improperly. And the maga-
zine still thought the United States should keep out of th e war *
It felt that although the nation might go in be the war for the
sake of neutral rights, there was no guarantee that the war
could accomplish anything fcr that end. The magazine stated
that without the United States power on %he side of the Allies
a peace of compromise was more likely. And it believed that
only a negotiated peace had a chance of Ringing about lasting
a 7peace
.
President Wilson's acceptance of concessions agreed
to by Germany as the result of the exchange of notes over the
Sussex incident was disappointing to THE NEW REPUBLIC. The
editors declared,
"Pie (the President) intends. .
as usual, zc wait and watch, trust-
ing that in the thick of tne most
ruthless and destructive war of his-
tory that the offenders will cease

to ©ffend • In the meantime he pro-
poses to do nothing tc make them
less willing to offend or^rnore anx-
ious tc be conciliating. 4®
The editors called President Wilson's type cf neu-
trality "hypocritical".
Justice "co Germans
At the same time the magazine called to the attention
of the American public certain justices bo the German argument.
It said Americans vvere childisn tc be angry because Germany had
lectured the United States cn its failure to enforce interna-
tional lav/ against Britain as well as Germany. Said THE NSW
REPUBLIC, "On any candid reading of the facts it is plain that
t:ie policy of the American government has been damaging to Ger-
many and helpful tc ths Allies." The magazine said that 'the
German argument was fair as well as embarrassing because the
American public had been "kidding" itself about its neutrality!
The American people had failed to face squarely the necessary
implications cf their decision that German victory was undesir-
able and that they would not approve any policy likely tc pro-
mote it. The public had tried to combine essential unneutrali-
ty with the avoidance cf its necessary consequences. Had Ameri-j
cans really placed neutral rights above Allied victory, the
United States would have placed an embargo on munitions to ei-
ther side. But the government had recognized the true public
feeling and because of the public delusion the government had
to use hypocrisy in its dealings with Germany. The government
should have been able to say to Germany, "England's methods
9

threaten neutral trade, yours threaten neutral existence ."^^
Acting upon the facts, fehe American government had
allowed Great Britain to execute the most comprehensive and in-
exorable blockade in the history of marine war, and all in de-
fiance of America's traditional attitude of a strict interpre-
tation of neutral rights. As a consequence of America's rigid
enforcement of similar ri - ts against Germany, the United States
had emasculated the submarine as a commerce destroyer.
The net result of American interference, according to
the magazine, had been to make the defeat of Germany possible
to an extent that would not have been possible merely as the re
suit of military operations. The German government rightly had
come to think of the United States as one of its enemies; and
had realized that the American attitude was a reflection of
fundamental American interests. For, stated THE NEW. REPUBLIC,
the United Stanes must associate with the power which could
threaten its national security more than any other and with
whom association would be mutually mos t beneficial. "Thus the
lo^ic of American unneutrality is pushing the country in the
direction of an arrangement with Great Britain. "51 Instead of
bein^ furtively unneutral, the United States should be openly
partisan; partisan not for the imperial ambitions of the Allies
but fcr their program for a safer Europe. ^2
V. :.l sen and the League
In the summer of 1=916, 'THE NEW REPUBLIC found some-
tiiin^ to cheer about. It was a speech by President Wilson in
4
which he urged the future creation of a League of Peace backed
by force and used to defend bhe community of nations. The
editors declared that the President deserved the gratitude of
all decent men for having pledged American aid for this civi-
lized end. American preparedness now would become the nation's
contribution to world peace. Wilson had broken with the tra-
dition of American isolation in the "only way which offers hope
to men. 1 ' Not only had he broken with isolation, he had ended
the "pernicious doctrine" of neutrality, and had declered that
in the future the United States could not be neutral between
the aggressor and the victim. The magazine said the Wilson
speech meant that America was ready to act on the belief that
war was no longer a matter between two sovereign nations but a
common world problem of law and order.
The editors were sure that the Wilson speech offered
Germany a way out. They said:
"Mr. Wilson has introduced a
new factor, . . into the calcula-
tions of European governments. . .
To Germany it means security in re-
turn for the abandonment of aggres-
sion. It offers her the choice be-
tween arming again to meet all Europe
and finding real safety in a league of
the Western World. . .For our part we
have no question that a people as edu-
cated as the Germans will make the
right choice once the opportunity is
offered with convincing sincerity . "53
Although enthusiastic about prospects for preventing
the next war, the magazine remained critical about the Wilson
administration's handling of the war on hand, and the American
1
public's inability to face reality. 'The magazine caustically
commented that the American public protected itself against
disagreeable and dangerous possibilities by ignoring them.
Americans accepted concessions contained in German diplomatic
notes and pretended net tc notice the reservations. As for the
administration, it had done nothing and written nothing to con-
vince Germany of its will or its ability to be neutral in the
sense of enforcing the old rules against both belligerents, nor
had it secured from Germany a repudiation of the sinking of the
Lusitania . Declared the editors of the Wilson government, "It
has no policy except of keeping out of trouble from day tc day;
and in this respect it is representative of prevailing American
public opinion."
Mid-summer of I'd 15 brought forebodings of a troubled
future to THE NE7v REPUBLIC. Recent developments were regarded
as providing a serious setback to propaganda for the abandon-
ment of isolation. These developments ware (1) the proposal
for a postwar trade battle of tariffs and boycotts, (2) Eng-
land's handling of the Irish, (3) the activity of Japan and
Russia in China, and (4) the British publication of a commer-
cial blacklist. The magazine saw this as an attempt to destroy
Germany, not to conquer her. America could not guarantee the
55type of reactionary peace these developments premised.
In September the magazine again asked the Allies to
offer Germany specific peace terms. The magazine was convinced
that xermeny was at bay and that the continuation of the war
CI
was up to the Allies. The journal was convinced another year
of war would contribute nothing to the settlement. It was felt
Wilson's pledge thai the United S babes would join a league to
enforce peace was enough of a guarantee that the Allies would he
safe from future 3-erman aggression if Germany was not crushed by
thi s war . u
u
The Presidential Slecbion of 1916
The coming of fall in 1916 meant politics. Charles
Evans hughes was runnin g for President against VJoodrcw Wilson.
And as a result of the Hughes policies and Vilson's espousal
of a league of peace, TB NEW REPUBLIC swung its editorial voice
to the support of the President. Editors Herbert Croly and-
".".'alter Lippman advocated ".Vilscn's re-election.
The magazine printed signed articles in favor of
Hugb.es. They were written by such men as Roland G. Usher and
Henry L. Stimson. Usher was a regular contributor to the jour-
nal but nob an editor. Stimscn's article was printed as repre-
sentative of Republican party opinion. The fact that THE NEW
REPUBLIC backed the Lemocratic Party was admitted by publisher
Willard Straight, himself a Republican.
'.".'alter Lippman, a friend of the Allied cause, praised
77ilson, who, he said, had never been neutral in thought or ac-
tion though he talked about it. The President, Lippman said,
had been "consistently and coura jecusly" benevolent to the
Allies. 53
Editor Croly said the V/ilson record had much to
(I
recommend it, Croly praised the President for taking the stump
when members of his own party had opposed the needed armament
program. And Wilson had prevented Congress from passing reso-
lutions which, Croly said, would have brought the United States
into collision with the Allies and given American consent to
the rei gn of anarchy on the high seas during war. Croly stated
that the majority of the opposition to the President had come
from the Republicans.
The editor lauded Wilson for keeping American claims
on neutral ri ;hta alive for post-war adjudication without hurt-
ing England. But to Croly the best thing about Wilson was his
new "revolutionary doctrine". Wilson had promised that the
United States would participate in any international system
which was oased upon good faith and would tend to organize
general security. Croly concluded:
:, In spite of his (V.ilscn's)
early skidding, he has gradually
reached an essentially scund and
really national foreign policy and
one whieh is backed by an increase
in the fleet sufficiently large to
make the United States a far more
considerable factor in the politics
of the world. "59
Several unsigned articles attacked Hughes' stsnd on
neutral rights because the candidate's position was regarded as
harmful to trie Allied cause. Hughes stated that the United
States should have dealt impartially with both Germany and the
Allies. This -was taken to mean that Hughes wanted to break the
British blockade of Germany,

WJE NET// REPUBLIC declared the Republican nominee
looked at neutral rights as a lawyer would, not as a statesman
should - as a ma iter of national policy, The magazine charged
that Hughes' position was a 3op to the German-Ameri can hyphenate
vote. And the magazine warned that if any racial prcup in the
country could successfully exert such an influence, America
would be cursed "by racial cleavage.
To sum up their opposition to Hughes, the editors
said that the accomplishment of his policies would have meant
the triumph of Germany and the doom of France and Belgium. As
it was, the waiving of American rights (in everything except
name) against the Allies and the insistence on them against G-er
many, was felt to have been America's greatest contribution to
the war against "German a agression" .
^
u
Germany and the League
Two weeks after Wilson's re-election, German chan-
cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg proclaimed his country's willing-
ness to consider participation in a league to enforce peace.
THE NEW REPUBLIC called the announcement the "most momentous
and encouraging utterance which has been made since the begin-
ning of the war "by the spokesman of a "belligerent government."
And the magazine agreed with the chancellor that if Germany was
to participate in the league, there must be a peace without
victory; all the essential controversies of the war must not be
decided, willy-nilly, against Germany, or else the l~aj;ue would
become nothing but a device to underwrite the Allied victory.

It would be a lea rue to prevent Germany from protesting against
the consequences of her defeat and as such would keep alive all
61
the old animosities and apprehensions.
But events of the next weeks put the damper on the
magazine's hopes. First there were the Belgian deportations.
The magazine declared that the German excuses were a confession
of guilt for the "horror" which had "revived the anger of the
American people." The Germans clearly did not understand that
Belgium had become a symbol of what made the liberal world anti-
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German in the war.
Then came the German invasion of Rumania. THE NEW
REPUBLIC recognized the Allied blunder in strategy which had
allowed Rumania to enter the war, ;iving Germany literally a
new lease on life as her invading troops took possession of Ru-
manian oil and wheat fields. The magazine concluded that the
new picture of the war made it impossible for the United States
to urge the Allies to make peace overtures to a triumphant Ger-
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many. The German offensive must be broken first.
Doubts
Meanwhile, THE NEW REPUBLIC found itself doubting
some phases of the Allied cause. The magazine angrily protested
the British refusal to grsnt the newly appointed ambassador from
Austria safe conduct to America. It was felt that this was an
intolerable discourtesy to the American government.
And the presence of fussla, Italy, Japan, and Rumania
in the Allied camp did not set well with the magazine. Espe-

X61ally disturbing was a Russian announcement that it had re-
ceived a definite premise of Constantinople. English and French
blood was tc be shed for Russian imperialism, and as a conse-
quence of Russian ambition Germany might be rendered helpless,
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excluded from the Balkans and the ivear Baa's'*
The magazine declared that "more and more the war has
ceased tc lock like a clean-cut fight between right" and wrong,
between democracy and absolutism, between public faith and in-
ternaticnal lawlessness."
Peace offensive
December, 1916, saw Germany making peace proposals to
the Allies. These proposals were regarded by THE NEW REPUBLIC
as liberal and consistent with' the magazine's ideal of peace
without victory. Trie problem of the British government with
ti ese proposals was realized. To accept the proposals at a time
when British military power was at a lew ebb meant the loss of
some of the imposing prestige of the British Empire-*
Restoration of the sea bus quo of tne pre-war period
would show that Germany had achieved a great victory over her
own allies, indeed nad organized fchem into her own Central
Europe Empire. The existence of Central Europe meant the end
of she traditional British role in the balance of power. And
ti e magazine doubted that the British would accept their new
position and willingly hand to America their old post in the
v 1
balance of power, however, said the magazine, tie British will
be doin^ a great wrong if bhey insist on continuing the war
(•
without being sure in tneir own minds that they could defeat
Germany at a bearable cost.
7/ilson and Militant Pacifism
After the issuance cf the German peace proposals,
President vyilscn sent a nets bo the belligerent governments
asking for information on their attitudes towards a league of
peace. The German reply, that the prevention of future wars
was a question to be dealt with after the settlement of the
current war, was regarded by the magazine as one which missed
the point cf the V.ilson note. The magazine declared that Ameri-
ca could abandon its isolationism and e .ter the European system
only for tne sake of a league of nations. The establishment of
principles for world peace was necessary before the settlement
of the war so tha b negotiating belligerents would not have their
military security uppermost in tieir thoughts in the bargaining.
THE IfE\J REPUBLIC defended the President against cri-
tics of his nets. These critics were mostly prc-ally Americans.
The magazine stated Lhac Wilson ha-: acted in the American in-
terssts as he should, and not with the wishes cf either belli-
gerent in mind. Wilson's note would serve as the opportunity
for a statement bj the Allies w-h.cx. woui 5 cleai' up many ambi-
guities of tx eir policies. By declaring their readiness bo dis-
cuss territorial details, once the principles of
'
peace guarsn-
tees were accepted by the Central Empire, the Allies would re-
assure Americans that tne popular objects of the war were still
tne real ones
.

The replies cf both t e Allies and the Central lowers
were disappointing to the Magazine. The editors thought the
Allied reply could not possibly win them additional support
from tired or wavering neutrals. Ana, said the editors, ne-
gotiations could not begin as lwng as Germany refused to con-
sider the viola z±cn of Belgium and northern France as the ob-
68ject of special treatment in the treaty of peace.
The President had launched his program of militant
pacificism, but American public opinion was not yet committed
to its support. To the editors, opposition tc the program ap-
peared to come from three sources: extreme pacifists who re-
pudiated force even in the interest of international order;
militarists who refused tc seek peace, and lawyers who resented
any attempt tc find a basis for international law except ab-
stract right, recognized precedent, and the voluntary consent
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of a society of free and absolute sovereigns.
Attitude towards Germany
On January 15, 1917 3 the editors of TEE NE77 REPUBLIC
answered what they said were requests fcr a definition of the
magazine's past demands of a destruction of militarism. As an
example cf that spirit which they sought tc have eliminated
the editors ;ave the Prussian brand of militarism - a militarise
which they said,
"
. . .had conscripted the body and
soul of the German nation, which had
played the bully in diplomacy, which
had proclaimed a national philosophy
intolerable to Europe, which respected

no treaty, overran and mutilated,
i Belgium, sank the Lusitania to the
widespread applause of the G-ermian
people, organized sedition and con-
spiracy cn neutral territory, tried
tc arouse a holy war in the East,
stood by while Armenians were massa-
cred, turned its face against all
effort to avert war, dreamed that
it would avei t the war, dreamed that
it would win supremacy in the world
by the most deliberate and ingenious
preparation mankind ever knew."^
Hie editors declared, :'Cf all the people it is the
liberal democrat who can say most sincerely that he hates this
thing, hates it in 3-ermany, hates an imitation of it ac home. 11 <
And the editors went on to say that their sympathies
lay with those persons who felt that the Allies must secure the
prestige of a victory in the field before they coulddare to en-
ter negotiations • A negotiated' peace would see Germany supreme
in Central Europe, but it did not follow that Germany would be
able to use its new empire as a basis for domination of all
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EQ.r6.p6 and the world.
Results of Wilson :;cte
A few days later a new note from the Allies accepted
the principle of a league of peace. Tc THE NEW REPUBLIC the
Allied statement was the supreme justification of President
Wilson's note. For now liberals could compare the acceptance
of the President's challenge by the Allies with the unsatis-
factory reply of the Germans. Liberal neutrals could a^ree on
the necessity of continuing the war until the Allies could win
a decisive battle. 'The President was helping to create an
#*
effective international public opinion.
'Hie allies had done much to clarify their objects
and confirm the sympathy and support cf neutrals, agreed the
magazine , but more was needed, German liberals were entitled
to more specific and comprehensive assurances than those con-
tained in the Allied note. Otherwise ib would not be easy to
7
convince the German pecple that they could obtain a just peace.
-.lore was also required of the United States. The
American people most shew their willingness to share the re-
sponsibilities cf the peace, to back up their President.
The President had told the world that America would
not share in a peace settlement which was dictated by the vic-
tor to the vanquished. A peace based upon faith in military
power would contain no hope for the future, and America could
not take part in it. A world organized in the creed of victory
would be a world in which America would be forced to arm to the
teeth and follow a purely national policy. THE NEW REPUBLIC
said:
"Americans in the mass do not
want to live in such a world. . .
Happily they have found a leader who
can express that feeling nobly and
eloquently, a man who knows his coun-
trymen well enough to state the tre-
mendous* alternative before them. Or-
ganized security or armed isolation -
that is the choice we have to make.
The better choice takes ccura ;e, means
risks, and heavy responsibility. But
the man would net be fit to live who
failed to try it after the agony of
these years. The President cannot suc-
ceed without the hearty support of the
American pecple. . ."74

Unrestricted Submarine Warfare
On January 31, 1917, Germany announced that cn the
following day her navy wculd resume unrestricted submarine 'war-
fare. THE NEW REPUBLIC responded in a supplement to its issue
of February 3. The magazine said that the long internal strug-
gle in Germany between the. moderates and the extremists was
over. The extremis ba had taken control of the situation, and
the whole history of the world would be altered as a result.
To che editors, the immediate duty of the United
States was clear. They advecated the direct Creaking of diplo-
matic relations with Germany. German ships in American har-
bors were fcc be seized at once and held as hostages. The Ameri-
can navy should be mobilized and an anti-submarine fleet assem-
bled. Merchant ships should be armed. And the government
should start planning economic and financial assistance to the
Allies .
The editors urged that economic and military con-
ferences between the Allies and all neutrals oe initiated, at
once. Anl, said tie editors, "with all clearness possible the
terms and conditions of our entrance into war should be dis-
cussed and announced."
The Break with Germany
President 'Ailson broke with Germany on February 3,
1917. his message was praised by THE NEW REPUBLIC for what it
regarded as a Lincolnian lack of bitterness. The magazine said
that only a pacifist who was a non-reals tant could desire any

different reply to Germany ! s action. In the past two years
there had been times when it was worthwhile tc pocket pride and
debate, because Germany was a house divided against itself.
But that time had passed, said TEE NEW REPUBLIC, and President
Wilson had acted as the hard facts demanded.
Moving towards 7iar
The editors realized that the United States was in a
sort of twilight zone between pe&ce and war. And they ur^ed
that the period of suspense be devoted zc increasing the pres-
sure on C-ermany. "The only course of action now," they -said,
"is to assume that there will be war." America's task was to
block cut the main lines of its participation, to adapt effect-
ively strategy to politics and action to strategy,
TEE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the United States was
not being drawn into the war as the upholder of an obsolete
system c'f maritime law. Instead, the United States was ranging
itself on the side of western sea power in i bs struggle to re-
sist continental land power. The United States was not punish-
ing a law oreaker, because both Britain and Germany had violatec.
the laws of the sea. America was becoming the open ally of botJ:
Britain and France since at the beginning of the war most Ameri-
cans decided that the Allies were fighting, in the main, for 'th€
kind of world in which they wished to live. And if America
wa ed war it would be because its own existence and the world's
crdsr depeno.ed on the defeat of the anarchy which the Germans'
had misnamed the "freedom of the seas." by contributing some-
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thin?; towards aavin 3 freedom of the seas, the united States
would have the ri jht to speak about its reform. Per, said the
magazine, "sea pov/er internationalized is the nucleus of the
league of oeace."
^
United States War Effort
However, the magazine was not sure that America shoul<j.
send an army to fight in Europe. Participation in the land
fighting might involve the United States in the territorial ad-
justment of Europe, a result of doubtful desirability to both
Europe and America, here, the magazine concurred with the
principle laid down by President Wilson. America was not anx-
ious to share in the settlement of Europe, but it was deeply
concerned in the kind of a settlement' tha c was to be made.
America wanted no part of any peace settlement which contained
the seeds of another war. Consequently, if the Allies wished
America to put; an army in the field, ohere first must be a spe-
cific definition of Allied peace terms 30 that; the United State^
could be assured of a just settlement.
If the war was prolonged it probably would be feasi-
ble to send volunteers to France, train them there as American
units, and embody them in the French or British Army. THE NEW
REPUBLIC wanted no independent American commanders, merely
American re3iments as tokens of friendship without involving
the United States as a nation in the detailed diplomacy of
Europe
.
In the meantime, the United States should train a
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reserve array at home. The pr ecaut ionarj" force would be raised
by conscription-. However t there would be exemptions and no
draftee could 50 overseas without his consent. A draft was
preferred over recruiting, because in the current condition of
the labor market the magazine felt that successful recruiting
would almost be impossible without a campaign of manufactured
hatred. ^°
Justification
Hie editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC admitted that the na-
tion was not confronted with the simple question of right or
wrong in which all the right was on America's side and all the
wrong on Germany's. It was admitted that tne German submarine
warfare against commerce, though barbarous, could not be attri-
buted to wanton malevolence on the part of Germany. Neverthe-
less, said the magazine, America was justified in waging war
for the purpose of protesting against it. Participation in the
war must be made to result in the creation of a new maritime
order. Hhat new order must be based on cooperation.
Again it was acknowledged that America was being
pulled into the war as a direct consequence of President Wil-
son's policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Allies. Ame-
rican neutrality had penalized Germany but had allowed Great
Britain zc defy American traditions of neutral rights, and had
permitted Great Britain to execute what the magazine called
"the most comprehensive and inexorable interdict on trade in
the history of marine law." Thus, seid the magazine, America

already had been playing a part In the war and behaving so as
to promote the success of one Tjroup of belligerents and the
failure of another.
The editors declared:
"The policy of benevolent neu-
trality, even though it has resulted
in war, is not one for which any apo-
logy needs to be made. It was dic-
tated by a sound and just estimate of
the issues of the great war and of the
proper relation of American national
purposes to those Issues.
American leanings toward the Allies were ascribed to
three main factors. It was inconceivable to the magazine that
a nation with the ideals of the United States could assist the
violator of Belgium to reap any benefit from the action. And
it was deemed equally abhorrent for a nation "so indissolubly
associated with the British Commonwealth by the vital facts of
geographical situation, economic intercourse and spiritual
partnership" to have done an injury to Britain in an hour of
peril or distress. America's choice was said to spring from
"an ultimate community of situation and disposition, in such
wise bhat a disaster to the British Commonwealth would leave
the American nation in imminent physical danger and in utter
physical isolation . "^
The magazine also feared the submarine, now in its
infancy, which might in the future be capable of destroying
sea power based upon Dattleships. The editors foresaw a
reign of terror on the seas, with neutral nations unable to
trade at all. The seas would cease to be the world's highway

but a new and worse kind of no-man's land. THE NEW REPUBLIC
stated, "The answer to this dilemma is, of course, plain. It
is the answer which the American nation is new making." Forced
to choose between maritime absolutism and maritime anarchy the
most professionally neutral of the great powers was throwing
neutrality in bo the discard, choosing the absolutism for the
moment. The reason for preferring the absolutism was that
81
America r.ad Getter reason to trust its representative.
The editors concluded that permanent peace was pos-
sible only if the organized ccimnunity of nations were to be
sovereign of the seas, and America should fight only with the
cause of ultimate pacification in mind. Under the leadership
of President Wilson the organization of peace had become Ameri-
can policy, and America T s possible participa bion in the war
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would give it an opportunity to try out that policy.
Readiness to Fight
The first effect of the German announcement of the
resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare had been to keep
snips in port. As a result there was a stop in the flow of
goods to iurope. The editors of TEE NEW REPUBLIC called upon
the United States government to end the state of fear which it
said was making a new and greater Belgium of the high seas.
The nation must act in keeping with its "sacred" obligation to
protect the smaller neutrals.
The editors declared that the ships should be put un-
der United States government orders, armed, and sent out on a

prescribed order w%th a notice to all the world that they were
sailing on sucl~ an such a date by a certain route to a specific
port. Ana, urged the editors, it should be publicized that bhe
armed forces of America would be behind these ships. Ihe maga-
zine declared, "If that is war, let it be war. . .we are deal-
ing with a mental condition which only the strength of this
nation alone can shatter."^
Ihe magazine went on bo argue that America's ines-
capable ci-cice was to aid Germany's plan of blockading the
United States cr to risk war for the sake of the Allies. The
editors said that any pacifist who would be impartial now was
helping German militarism and taking responsibility for a Ger-
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man victory with all that such a victory might imply. And
IT'S NEW REPUBLIC wa3 convinced chat German victory would mean
dominion of the world by reactionary military power, a world
in which permanent peace would be impossible, a world in which
the United States, if it insisted upon the Monroe Doctrine,
would someday have to fi ;r:t Germany all alone. Prom this view-
point, it seemed to the magazine that the Allied cause was li-
terally America's.
The defense of the Atlantic 'Acrid
TEE NEW REPUBLIC admitted that the .Allied blockade
of Germany, a blockade which existed through the lenient atti-
tude of the United States, was as terrible a weapon as the
submarine. The German people were suffering from the blockade
and the vitality of German children was bein^; sapped by i t
.
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But, said the magazine, its support cf the blockade was not
based upon the legality or illegality cT it or even upon the
issue of cruelty and mercy. The magazine declared America
right In accepting the blockade and defying the submarine be-
cause the war against the Allies was a war against a civili-
zation of which America was a part. America could not stand by
as long as there was the least chance of Terviany winning. Hie
true and only justification for American policy^ said the maga-
zine, was that the United States had accepted the closure cf
the sees to Germany and the opening of them to the Allies be-
cause Iz could not permit a German triumph.
Hie United 3 Gates had clo ched ,i ts most unneutral pur-
poses in the language of neutrality, but could net go on fcr-
ever without feeing the consequences. So, the magazine said,
"v/i.en we talk about American honor being involved we meant just
this: ,tha t since we have created an unneutral policy we cannot
now abanccn it because it is dangerous.""
The editors concluded that "the safety of the Atlantic
wcrld is something fcr which America should fight. " They
said that 8 profound web of interest which was joining the
western world together had grewn up on the twe shores cf the
Atlantic. If the Atlantic community were detroyed, America
would knov; what it had lost, wculd then understand the meaning
cf the unfortified Canadian border, and the common protection
given Latin-America by the British and American fleets.
"It is the crime cf Germany," said THE MSV REPUBLIC,
(>
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"that she is trying to make hideous the highways by which the
Atlantic powers liv3. ,,b^ Had Germany stocd on the defensive
a;ainst Britain and France, and limited the war to the Balkans
and the eastern frcnt, and clearly thrown in her lot wi th the
Western nations, she would have had their neutrality and per-
hap s the ir s yrupa thy .
Instead, Germany sought to cut the vital highways of
the Atlantic world. SHE NEvV REPUBLIC believed that Atlantic
civilize ti cn, if net all civilizati on, was at stake.
The magazine predicted tnat victory on the high seas
would mean the triumph of that class which it said was seeking
to make* Germany the leader of the East against the V.'est, the
leader of an ultimate German -Rus sian- Japanese coalition against
tne Atlantic world.
However, Germany belonged in the Atlantic world. And
the magazine was convinced that she would join the Western com-
munity if the war was effectively fought and ended wisely:
"Cur aim must be not to conquer Germany
as Rome conquered Carthage, but to win
Germany as Lincoln strove to win the
South, to win he 2 for union with cur
civilization by discreditin • those
classes who alone are our enemies.
It is no paradox and no sentimentality
to say that we must fight Germany not
to destroy her but to force her and
lure her back be the civilization in
which she belongs."^
Tne magazine concluded tnat the issue never really
had been one of neutral rigr.ts, that to ,fight for them alone
would be to isolate America from her natural allies and leave
t
her exposed after the war. For nc form of action could be de-
vised which would vindicate all neutral rights'* The defeat of
Germany in itself would not necessarily mean vindication.
America must fight for a common interest of the western world.
And American entrance into the war would weight that world in
favor of liberalism, and make the organization of a league of
peace an immediately practical object. The defense of the
Y/estern world would be the cornerstone cf world federation.
The real danger to a decent peace, the ma jazine said, had al-
ways been that the western nations would become so dependent
on Japan and Russia that they would have to pa;y~ any price for
their loyalty. American entrance would give the liberal forces
on ths Allied side the preponderance of strength. Thus the
90
liberals would decide the reorganization of the world.
Armed Merchantmen
The month of March 1917, saw several American ves-
sels sunk by German submarines. President Wilson's first re-
action was to ask authority to arm merchant vessels. This
armed neutrality was criticized by THE NEW REPUBLIC as solely
a makeshift measure, and not one which would settle anything.
It could net be permanent policy. The President should, the
magazine asserted, instruct the ship captains to consider the
approach of any submarine as a hostile act. These instructions
should be published and Germany informed that the torpedoing
cf eny American vessel would be considered evidence that a
state of war existed between Germany and the United States.
4
The maxazine declared that Germany was fully aware bhat she
courted war but believed the results of submarine -warfare were
worth the risk. The time had ccme for America to either back
down or follow through ii;s policy cf oenevolent neutrality with
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tne proper resistance to aggression, \
Incomplete Participation
America cculd no longer be independent in policy in
re ard tc the war. Its policy of benevolent neutrality had
brought it tc the point where it must threw in its lot with the
Allies. But even though it advocated American entrance into
the war, THE NEW REPUBLIC was unwilling to have America throw
in its lot wi ti the Allies completely. America's support of
world peace was the justification for its pro-All'-' policy. The
justification for an incomplete participation in the war was
that the Allies had purely national aims in mind mixed with
their international purposes. Tne magazine said that America
had the same ^cals as the Allies in so far as they aimed at se-
curity based upon a scientific settlement. But for the rest,
the magazine wanted the United States tc hold alccf and reserve
freedom of action: "Just as cor neutrality has attempted, to
discriminate, so would cur waifare."
As for America's peace aims, the magazine did not
regard the league of peace as the unreality it was called by
its critics. As proof tha t it could be s real thing, the maga-
zine offered the actions of the Jnited States, whicr. it said
were actions based upon the principles cf such a lea me. The
/I
united States had discriminated against Germany because it nad
judged Germany to be the disturber of the peace. And the league
of peace would be at first nothing more than a lormal agreement
to discriminate still more sharply in the future against the
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a : pressor
.
That same month of r^arch, 1917, saw the revelation of
the Zimmermann note in which Germany tried to make an alliance
with Mexico in case of a war with the united Stakes, THE NEW
REPUBLIC felt that Germany was justified in goA^g behind the
subterfuge of American neutrality and classifying America as
an enemy power. Tne lesson for the United States was its de-
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pendence upon allies.
-fiect of Participation
Meanwhile bhe magazine considered the effect of Ameri-
can participation in tie, war. The magazine said that with
American aid, the Allies could break the submarine. And Ameri-
can entrance would convince the Germans that they were not des-
tined to emerge from the war as victors. It would increase
their impatience with the sacrifices demanded by the war. Ger-
many would finally be ready to talk peace- as one of raar.y af-
flicted nations not in the role of a conqueror. This would make
possible a peace in which German security, as well as chat of
other nations, would be established upon a basis of internation-
al organization.
The united States must not, insisted the magazine,
allow its power to be used for tne subjU3ation and humiliation
I>
of Germany. Trie editors declared, "Unless America can emerge
from the war as a member of a securer international order, un-
less a league of peace, based on a stable settlement results,
we shall have made the war of 1917 as inconsequential as the
war of 1812. . . It was up to America to avow openly its
intention that it be the one powerful belligerent at the peace
conference which would be unreservedly committed to the organi-
zation of peace. The united States would be the one great na-
tion which could gain nothing by a new balance of power, the
one nation which could win only if the whole world was made
more secure. This fact, acknowledged the magazine, was not due
to sny specific virtue in the United Stages, but rather from
• • 96the situation in which the nation found itself.
Trie Overt Act
Cn March 16, 1917, submarines sank tnree American
ships with the less of fifteen lives. President '"/ilson called
a special session of Congress for April 2. It was obvious that
the crisis was at hand.
THE SEW REPUBLIC stated that there was no policy shor
of war which v/ould re-establish and rescue imperiled American
rights. The magazine asserted that Americe new had an unim-
peachable case against Germany, which was net committing acts
97
of war that demanded resistance and counter-attack. The Ger-
man submarine campsign had forced the United States into the
war by the inexorable lo^lc of its own situation and purposes.
Trie American people, with their deeply rooted pacifism, their
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tradition and prdde of neutral independence , had not been able
to e void conflict. America could not withdraw its flag from
the seas at the bidding of an aggressor. It had not been able
to insist on neutral rights against both belligerents without
doin^ more harm to the Allies than to G-ermany. Consequently,
continued the magazine, America found it must take up armed re-
sistance to German agression or abandon any rijht to be con-
sulted about the system of law and government which was to pre-
vaii in the future on the hlgfc seas during war. 3
The Ireat decision
President Wilson delivered his war message to the
special session of Congress on April 2. In the next four days
both houses passed resolutions declaring that Germany had al-
ready made war upon the United States. t
The decision to lead the united States into war had
been made by the man TEE NEW REPUBLIC called "the least jin^o
and the most peaceful cf American presidents." The magazine
ssid that the United StaLes had declared war after her patience
had been exhausted with a nation which failed at every chance
to show that her crimes were blunders, not the normal expressicr
of her character
.
The President had in December ,^'iven Germany the oppor-
tunity tc say that they renounced conquest and cared for zhe
or -j;aniza bion cf a stable international system. Said the maga-
zine, "They could not accept the offer because they had not
renounced conquest. .
i
The magazine went cn fcc say that the success of such
a German government with such a policy would make the twentieth
century a period of profound reaction. It would mean the de-
feat of the new Russian revolution, the absorption of the small
nations of Central Europe, the humiliation of France, the dis-
integration of the British Commonwealth, the terrorizing of the
Americas, and the fastening upon the whole world of a system of
aggressive policies backed by an illiberal collectivism. Only
the military virtues could survive and a league of peace would
be impossible.
On the other hand, declared the magazine, President
Wilson was the most liberal statesmen in high office, and be-
fore long probably the most powerful: "he represents the best
hope in the whole world. He can go ahead exultihgly with the
,,100blessings of men and women upon him."

INTERIM
TEE PERIOD BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS
The purpose of this portion of the work is to bridge
the jap between the two ":reat WorXd Wars. This diert transition
examines the attitude cf TEE NEW REPUBLIC toward the main issued
resulting from World War One and leading to World War Two.
Among these were the Treaty of Versailles, the Lea ;ue cf Nations,
the Washington Conference, brie Kellogj-Briand Pact, and tne
American Neutrality Laws.
Versailles
Basel on tne evidence offered in Chapter One of this
investigation, it wculd not be hard to predict the attitude cf
the magazine towards the. rreaty cf Versailles. THE NEW REPUB-
LIC had always insisted that Germany must not be crushed but
must be won over as a member of the Atlantic World. Tree ted
fairly and shown the t militarism did not pay, Germany, the
ma ;azine said, could become a valuable and loyal member of
western civilization. But if the Allies used their victory to
further their imperial Embitions, Germany would see that mili-
tarism did pay, as Ion; as one was cn the winning side.
Thus the magazine withdrew from its stand alongside
cf President 'Aoodrow Wilson when he returned from Paris to try
to convince Americans to support the 'Treaty of Versailles. The
magazine declared, "Le ('..ilscn) seems certain to fail in the
i
end, and he deserves to fail." The journal said that Wilson
had sacrificed uhe Treaty for the sake cf che League of ha-
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tioas .
The magazine declared that the recovery cf Europe de-
pend d upon the readinissicn cf Germany and Russia to the soci-
ety cf nations. Recovery presupposed the reversal of the po-
licy adopted at Versailles under which Prance plus tne cordon
sanitaire were to govern Europe in the name of feke incomplete
League cr Nations.
TEE :: : 1PUBLIC Insisted in the spring of 1920 that
the events cf the past year had justified the opponents of the
Treaty of Versailles. The editors characterized the behavior
of the zLuropean governments as based upon power politics and
the economics of exclusive national interest and private profit
"That," the editors said, "is why they wrote as bad a treaty
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as the Treaty cf Versailles." °
'Vhat attitude should the American progressive Lake?
According to TUT NEW REPUBLIC, the progressive could only de-
clare that the facts showed the Treaty of • srsailles to be no-
thing but an unworkable interim agreement. Instead, liberals
should work for a new peace conference, one in which Russia,
lermany, and China wculd participate as equals, as they must if
there was ever to be an enduring peace. And said the magazine,
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. .from such a conference America cculd not abstain."
however, the magazine felt that a satisfactory or
even a semi-3atisfactcry revision of the Treaty of Versailles
i
would be a task of "colossal difficulty." Revision migfat be
impossible as Long ss the temper- and tre power of France re-
mained what it was. The magazine believed that France pro-
bably would continue to pursue "ti. e perilous and arrc^an; path
of ns tional egotism and try tc block the work of creating a
concert of. Europe based upon certain general principles cf na-
tional development and international comity." France was ccn-
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vinced that her security demanded a we a** Germany.
League of Nations
Tied tc the Treaty of Versailles was the ueague of
Nations, which did not meet the requirements set by TT IS NEW
REPUBLIC in its Icng advocacy of a league tc enforce peace.
The magazine criticized the tying-in of the League with the
treaty. The Treaty of Versailles derived its sanction from
force, not from cons en b. As a result, said the magazine, the
League of Nations would never be able to substitute conference
- 106fcr war.
Trie editors pointed out that the League was at the
mercy of the autocratic reparations commission created at Ver-
sailles. The commission was characterized as composed cf the
same reactionary diplomats who had broken faith with the peace-
loving peoples of the world. The League would not only fail to
keep peace, it would discredit for generations the very idea of
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a league*
Consequently, the editcrs felt that the United States
should abstain frcm joining the League for a while. If the

United States joined, the reactic series would see no need to
modify the Versailles Treaty. With the united States on the
outside, the unstable peace settlement might cause thu victors
tc make the needed changes before it was tec late.
Washington. Conference
-Le Washington Conference, wk i or took up naval dis-
armament, was seen as indicative of some moral recovery from
the anarchy and disorder of World War One. the treacles result
ing from the conference were regarded as substantial achieve-
ments.. Brt, warned the magazine, they were only be~innin_;s.
If they were net followed up, if they were treated as a settle-
ment rather than as a significant advance in a premising direc-
tion, their benefits would in the long run prcve illuscry. THE
NEW b LP jBLIC stated fehat the treaties deserved to be ratified
without any reservations cr mod ifleadens
Kellogg^Briaiid Pact
THE NEW REPUBLIC also fsvered United States' entrance
109into the World Court ana thought the hellcgg-Briand Pact to
outlaw -war was useful althcu~n weak and va^ue. The rns azine
predicted chat nations which simed the pact would make more
U3e cf conferences and arbitretion fcr the sake of public opin-
icn. Thus the pact would raise tne moral tcne of international
relations .
Tne agreement was seen as possessing some cf the ad-
van ca^es of the Lea 3ue cf hatiens minus the curse of bein^ tied
to tie Versailles ireacy. And whatever its intrinsic value, it
1
was regarded ss a milestone on the path to peace which must be
passed oefore nations could advance to more genuine accomplish-
Ill
menus
.
Fascism
Europe seemed bo make progress despite the ominous
rise to power of the Fascists in Italy. But the appearance of
Hitler in Germany began the real backward turn of the clock as
Europe again took up the trail leading to world war.
One of the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC, George Soule,
in a review in 1940 of the history of the magazine's foreign
policy, noted that the magazine opposed appeasing Hitler from
the suart. Once Germany had accepted Nazism, it was too late.
Soule pointed out the magazine's distrust of what it felt were
reactionary governments in England and France. A distrust which
the magazine said was proved correct by events in Ethiopia,
112Austria, Spain, and finally Czechoslovakia.
Neutrality Laws
Between 1935 and 1937 the United States Congress
passed three Neutrality Acts in an effort to prevent America
from beino; impelled into the next v/ar by any force except the
free choice of the American people. THE NEW REPUBLIC favored
the laws because the acts recognized the dilemma which had
arisen in the last war and prepared to avoid it. The laws
would work out in practice with British command of the sea.
The nation had acquiesced in the British blockade before it was
ever applied, had avoided trouble with German count ermeasures
,
(I
*and had made it possible to avoid a doom in credit and industry
based upon supplying the Allies. At trie same time, they did
not deprive the British of war essentials, especially after they|
were modified by the repeal of the munitions embargo • ^
Spain
Meanwhile j Germany, Italy and Russia were staging
their war rehearsal in Spain. HUB . '^PUBLIC condemned France
as a fascist and the advance agent of Herman and Italian Im-
11
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perialism.
Tne magazine sharply criticized the American embargo
on arms to the Spanish loyalists, calling it a violation of in-
ternational precedent and an unneutral gesture. Tne magazine
reasoned that the embargo could not be a truly neutral act un-
115less applied also to Germany, Italy and Portugal. Tne em-
bargo was criticized as an act inspired by the influence of
British Tories in the American government. And the magazine
classified these Tories with the Fascists. Tne editors argued
that they were still in favor cf the neutrality acts, but could
not see why they should be applied to the civil war in Spain
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since there was no question of involvement of the United States.
On February 1, 1959, THE NEW REPUBLIC took upon itself
a rare action. The editors sent a telegram to President Roose-
velt urging him to end the "unneutral" embargo on Spain. The
embargo, said the telegram, ". . .is helping to turn Spain ever
tc the friend cf hitler and Mussolini*" The President was
ur^ed to shake off the influence of British Tories and act in
CI
the interests of liberalism. The editors assured the* President
that he had the power to lift the embargo without action by
Congress. The telegram was signed "The editors cf THE HEW RE-
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PUBLIC."
10
CHAPTER II
WORLD WAR TWO
In the summer of 19o9 war clouds again gathered over
Europe. And HEE NEW REPUBLIC magazine was about to enter
another period which would see it, as in World War Cne, start
off by insisting the new war did not concern the United States,
then decide that the nation must -help Britain, next pass on to
the decision that the United States must devote its entire in-
dustrial system to supplying En -land's defense needs, and fi-
nally call fcr the United States to enter World War Two. It
will be seen that 3HI NEW REPUBLIC, although disgusted with
British conservatives, came to favor warfare against Germany
because the journal was convinced of the evil destiny of the
Rami government and its threat to America even more than it was
convinced of the necessity to stop haiserism. And World War
Two had an added factor, the Japanese Empire.
August, 1959, the month before the start of World War
Two, saw two critical developments. President Franklin D.
Roosevelt denounced the 1911 commercial treaty between the
United Staces and Japan. And Russia and Germany signed a non-
a r ess ion pact
.
Treaty with Japan
3EE WM REPUBLIC declared the President's action
should have come two years earlier. Ke should, the magazine

said, have invoked the Neutrality Act a rains t the Japanese at
the beginning of their war with China.
»!Ehe magazine stated," In one day he { the President)
has brought; tne United Sta tes far slon 3 bk«fc read towards war
with Japan." 'Ihe President was criticized f cr 'assumin - too
much responsibility in taking such action without consulting
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Con :r ess .
German-Russian Pact
The German -Rus si an ncn-a :^ress ion pact appeared to
tne magazine to be proof that European affairs were still full
of insincerity, devious meGhcds, secrets, and surprises. So
much so uhat Americans should not be taken a'oack at any treach-
ery or weakness.
The magazine said Americans should learn the lesson
of not bein^, taken in by idealistic slogans. Seme persons were
ar^uin^ that since the British Empire was deprived of Russian
military nelp, the United States must step in and save it.
"...aybe so," said the magazine, "but in that case let us make
the decision in serins of hard skepticism and not because of an
ideological crusade." The magazine went on to say that Ameri-
cans should concentrate solely on what really was dear to them,
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the promise of democracy at nome . Evidently, the editors
were still tender from the disillusionment of the post war pe-
riod after 1918.
Cash-and-Carry
On September first, ldo9, German planes attacked in

.Poland, and World War Two was on. The first concern of THE NSW
REPUBLIC was to determine how America might stay cut of the war.
It was obvious that public sympathy was with the Allies. But
it was important that America should not be forced into the
war for emotional reasons or by the pressure of events as in
the previous war. America must decide its course realistically
after consideration of the issues.
It was edmitted that a British defeat and the possible
acquisition of the British fleet by Hitler could bring war to
America. The best way to keep America out of war, it was con-
cluded, was to find ways to help the Allies without dragging
America into danger. America must again adopt benevolent neu-
trality.
Consequently, the magazine began a campaign for amend-
ment of the Neutrality Laws to provide for cash-and-carry trade
in munitions. As long as goods were carried in allied ships,
America would not be involved by German submarine warfare. And
THE NSW REPUBLIC felt that though legally neutral, cash-and-
carry would help the Allies, who controlled the seas. "Ivlore
than this," the editors said, "we are not prepared to do, but
less than this is too little ^
In the ensuing weeks the magazine continued to fight
for the principle of cash-and-carry. One article said, "It is
net half so important whether we export munitions or not as
whether cur exports, whatever they may be, shall pass out of
our jurisdiction the moment they leave our shores." And the
t\
magazine characterized as sinister what it said were attempts
by certain conservative Republicans to repeal the neutrality
laws entirely in tne interest of war profits. ihe magazine
said, "That would leave us in tne same situation as before 1917:
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nothing would mere quickly and surely involve us."
Ihe magazine insisted that cash-and-carry was the
only possible answer to the question of how to keep America fro:
getting involved in the war. It was realized that cash-and-
carry did not give the country any real guarantee of staying
aloof - . .it may be that the American people will decide to
join the war in any case" - but it o:ave the nation its only
chance
.
The editors explained their stand this way:
"Let any nation which wishes to
do so come to our shores and buy ^oods
of any kind it desires. Let it pay
cash and take title on the dock. Let
it then transmit these goods in its own
ships, manned by its own citizens. If
one cf these ships were sunk, it would
call for sympathy and indignation, but
it would not, as in the case cf cne cf
our own vessels, demand that 'our honor
,
be avenged. ' As long as the British
navy commands the sea, the beneficiaries
of this plan would oe the Allies, which
would be in agreement with what our peo-
ple want. At the same .time, the terms
would be open to all, which is as amen
as can be expected of any neutral nation
in the world of realities . "122
War Guilt
THE NEVH REPUBLIC held tne Allies partly to blame for
the war. Poland had accepted in ls>19 territory with a pre-
ponderantly German population. England and France had greatly
t
reduced the military effectiveness of the coalition against
Hitler by the betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich* The Allied
policy of appeasement had strengthened Hitler's belief that,
they would not stand up to him, and encouraged him to make de-
mands upon Poland from which he would have found it difficult
tc withdraw.
Even further back, England and France had imposed an
unjust peace and a destructive treaty upon Germany. French po-
licy, under Poincare, the magazine said, was openly intended to
keep Germany crushed forever.
And, declared IKE NEW REPUBLIC: if the United States
had net entered the war in 1917, a negotiated peace based on
the stalemate of exhaustion would probably have taken place.
America had made possible the Allied victory which in turn pro-
duced the unjust treaties of 1&>!9.
However, it was the undoubted fact that it was Hitler
who had chosen be resort tc arms. The magazine declared that
he thereby had destroyed whatever mcral case he mlgiat have had
for tr_e return oi territory and populations wrested from German
i
in 1919.
The magazine said '.hat all Europe, including the
German people, had 'wanted peace. But Hitler wanted war. The
ma-azine declared, " . . .it is indelibly written in the record .
that German airplanes attacked Polish towns. . .befcre any de-
claration cf war, Defcre any Polisr: a
;
session that could pos-
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sibly have justified such a thing*"

As in the previous war, the magazine Derail to insist
early that the Allies publish their war aims and possible peace
terms. The magazine editors deemed It necessary to know wheth-
er the Allies were after permanent peace or were just cut; to
crush Hitler, The editors wanted to Know If the Allies intend-
ed to crush ~ermany so that she would again be dominated by a
passicn for r3venge, and be ready to greet a new Hitler in
another quarter of a century.
It was pointed cut that in the lest war Americans had
been told they were fighting fcr justice and democracy. But
it later turned cut that the imperialist Allies had written a
group of secret treaties which made a just settlement impos-
si ole
.
Trie next week it was reported chat Hitler was ready
to discuss peace with the Allies. But the magazine supported
tne Allied announcement that the proposals would be rejected if
proffered. The magazine ssid it was vary nearly true that there
never was a bad peace or a good war. But Hitler did not pro-
pose peace, but an armistice. The editors insisted that Hit-
ler's program was net complete. In six months his ambition
would again plunge Europe into conflict. Peace tc him was a
time when one got what one w&nted by threatening tc fight; in
wartime you got it by fighting. Tne Allies could not demobilize
on tne strength of promises made by the -author of the philoso-
phy of falsehood advocated in >.ein K ampf .
He,/ever, the Allies were advised to make counter-pro-
»<
t
posals so that the lerman people would be reassured as to the
consequences if they should throw in their let with Hitler's
125
enemies
.
Arms Embargo
Meanwhile , the repeal of the arms embargo was being
debated in Congress. A.-d in its editorial ccnumns, -I'dh, WI'V
: BE JBi_IC was declaring that the issues of trie war were clear
enough to wsrrant grajfitisg the Allies that aid.
The ms gazine was worried about American emotions. It
felt that Hitler was sc greatly nated and feared that if he
seemed to be winning the war at any time, Americans would feel
their interests threatened. These emotions were regarded as
America's greatest danger. The editors declared that if the
arms embargo were lifted the knowledge that the Allies were de-
riving as much help as they could without the aoandonment of
Anencan neutrality would provide a safety-valve for these emo-
tions. On the other hand, if the embargo were retained, a
balked desire tc nelp might swin^ the pendulum tec far in the
other direction. The magazine seated, "There is nothing in
sellin~ arms that can automatically and inevitably involve us,
126
sc long as the people do net want to fight."
A view of what the magazine thought of cne of the
leading Kazis may be gained through an editorial paragraph on
the sinking of the Athenia in October of i»3=*. Trie magazine
took a 3oebbels speech accusing Winston Churchill of the crime
as a confession that the Oermans were responsible. The para-
(
graph stabed that if there was one man in the world who most
Americans would be sure was lying in every word unless the ccn-
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trary were conclusively proved, it was Goebbels.
Allied Fascism
In "November, the magazine voiced more criticisms of
what it felt were an ti -democratic forces in the Allied camp.
It commented sharply upon the Frencn practice of interning anti-r
fascist refugees whose nationalities were German, The magazine
pondered, "When the French get through fighting for democracy
under leaders whose allegiance is dubious, how much democracy
"I oc
are they ;;oing to have left."
That same month the British government published a
Yvhite Paper descrioinj the mistreatment of Jewish and other-
prisoners in German concentration camps. THE NEW REPUBLIC
staged that in view of what was already known of the Nazis the
atrocity stories prcbabiy were true. But, pointed out the ma-
gazine, the "ThLte Paper consisted of reports from British diplo-
mats in Germany accumuleted over a long period of time. There-
fore, the magazine declared, Cnamberlain knew about "these
dreadful stories" when he sat down with Hitler at Munich and
then returned to Britain wreathed in smiles. And British diplo->
mats and financiers unew about them when they hobnobbed with
Goering that summer before the war in the discussions of a loan
to hslp lervaar.y get on her feet. It was obvious that the White
Paper was published only because the two countries were now at
war and it made good propaganda. THE NEW. REPUBLIC declared,
\
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"Diplomats have strong stomachs."
Far Kast Warning
Mean-while, the ma razine gave warning to Americans
that while their eyes were riveted upon Europe, important chang|
es had been developing in the Far East. WE NETS REPUBLIC ad-
monished Americans that they were more likely to become involved
in a war in Asia felian in Europe, The government was poised on
the brink of a decision few citizens understood or for which t
they were prepared. The magazine stated, "It is a time to de-
vote careful attention to Far Eastern policy if war is not to
come in by the back door while we are engaged in barring it at
the front." 150
The editors recognized that the united States was the
chief obstacle zc Japanese plans for domination of Asia. The
United States had abrogated its trade treaty with Japan, a ne-
cessary step before establishing embargoes on materials which
Japan needed both for war ana for peacetime commerce. At the
same time, the expansion of ths American navy was alarming Ja-
panese military quarters who new pointed to the United States
as the eventual enemy.
The magazine regarded the proposed embargoes and en-
forcement of Janan's retirement from China as obvious steps
tewsrd war, a war which it was believed Japan was incapable of
winning. However, it was important that the Western nations
neither appease Japan nor war with her while the European batcl^
was on.
I
To solve the dilemma, the magazine proposed that
Japan oe assured <:ha b all the 7,'estern nations would withdraw
from China alcng with her. And Japan would he premised a large
share in the development of Chinese industry and trade.
Revised Neutrality Act
As far as THE NEW REPUBLIC was concerned, the revised
Neutrality Act, with cash-and-carry and the banning of American
siilps from war zones, was working out well. Neutral ships were
being sunk around England every day. But for the war zone ban,
some American ships raight have been sunk and American citizens
killed. And interventionists in the United States would have
had a strong emotional argument. The magazine cautioned that
it was necessary to make sure that violently pro -Ally officials
in Washington did not find ways of slipping through legal loop-
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hcles and getting the nation into trouble.
The magazine asserted both Germany and Britain were
violating tiie Pan American neutrality zone. Britain was not
blamed for chasing the Graf Spee to the South American shore.
But there were reports also of British raids on German commerce
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in that area.
Later, the magazine was to support the State Depart-
ment's vigorous pretests against British seizure of mails off
American ships. It was advocated that the mails issue and
others be turned over to the Hague Court.
Cynicism
The stert of the new year of 1940 brought the announce-

merit from the German government of their favorable attitude
towards a European Federation. This was the occasion for a
NEW REPUBLIC editorial full of the cynicism it had learned as
the result of World War Two.
The editors spoke of the small value of lip service
given popular ideals as ideological covers for sinister forces.
American were warned to be wary of mailing the same mistake they
had made in 1917 wixen they had entered the war under the ban-
ner of Wilscnian idealism, which called for a just and moderate
peace as the basis for a new world order. But, the editors
said, both the peace terms and the League of Nations had been
used as vehicles for the realistic aims of the vindictive poli-
ticians and military strategists of the victorious nacicns.
The editors said that this time Che danger was not
all i rem totalitarian nations. For tr.e strongest groups in
France intended to pulverize Germany to prevent any fucure re-
surgence. And ohe British Tories coull.not be trusted to put
reality into any federation they did not dominate.
THE NSH REPUBLIC declared, "This is essentially a
European civil war. . .Europe must mske and preserve its own
peace .
"
Keep Cut of War
That was the winter that Finland was fighting for Its
life in the snow against the Russian invasion. THE NEW REPUB-
LIC favored treating Finland as any otner belligerent, and said
it was up to the Allies, not America,, to extend credit to the
*
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little Scandinavian land.
The magazine predicted that Norway and Sweden, Bel-
gium and Holland were likely to be future victims of aggression
Tne emotional strain on Americans would be great. But said the
magazine, " . . .we have decided chat tne part of wisdom - for
1 55the world's sake as well as ours - is to remain at peace."
Tne determination of tne magazine that America should
keep out of this war was shewn also by its criticisms of Presi-
dent Roosevelt and c Gher politicians who were asking Congress at
that time to create a greatly strengthened American navy. The
'magazine pointed cut that in its opinion the nation did not havq
a coherent foreign policy, thus tne country could net possibly
have a sensible naval and military plan. The magazine said
Roosevelt was an interventionist by nature, but that the country,
as a whole was isolationist. And it was concluded that the
country correctly wanted a military establishment only large
enough for defense.
The magazine's fear of war was, as has been shown,
two-fold: fear of war in Asia as well as Europe. The editors
were afraid that America's economic war of nerves against Japan
would cause the Japanese rulers to seek war a 3 an escape from
the loss of "face" which would result from a pull-out from Chinsj
caused by lack of supplies. The United States must make these
rulers see the advantage of withdrawing from China alon 1; with
the Ifes tern nations^ and then sharing equitably in future trade
and investment.
r*
0 tnerwise , the editors maintained, "There is real
1
" 7danger cf our becoming involved in a war that nobody wants." u
Moral Side of Y»ar
The ot.Ler danger to America was said to be the moral
urge toward war felt by groups of intelligent citizens. TEE
feJEW REPUBLIC said it understood how these citizens felt - that
one could not jo on day after day believing that one belligerenl
was both dangerous and despicable , without feeling a sort of mo-
ral delinquency in failing tc contribute to the cause.
The magazine declared that the valid reply to these
people was that they were mistaken- in putting the war in moral
terms cf a battle between evil and righteousness.
The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC issued a strong state-
ment cf their own position:
. .we now explicitly and permanently
renounce any belief that evil can be
crushed by exterminating these who seem
for the moment to embody it. This is
net just wishy-washy liberalism: it is
the sternest lesson of history. The last
war generation learned it to their gr>eat
cost. We can see something else, hew-
ever, worth as much struggle, and sacri-
fice as the tragic and futile but seme-
times necessary effort to deal with evil
by physical warfare. . .it is the effort
tc prepare to restore in the part of the
world that is ravaged by war. . .a peace
that does not contain within itself the
seeds of its own des true ti on . "138
World War One
Taking up the same theme two weeks later, the editors
pointed to the "unholy mess" caused by the profound ignorance
and lofty confidence with which America had helped tc redraw
f\
Europe's boundaries after the previous war. The magazine re-
collected Saow how America, aghast at tie implications of what
it had helped to do, had withdrawn support from the unstable
European peace structure, and lei; it fall. The journal repeated
its stand that with respect to such things as immediate military
and strategic considerations, national boundaries, and rival im->
perialisms, this was a European civil war: HW@ have no business
fi ;htin.g in it and we have no permanent contribution to make in
deciding its issues." Europe must end its own quarrels or they
would never be ended.
The Future
The magazine held America's future task to be co-
operation in post-war efforts to create the kind of a world of
freedom and social and economic justice in which the Nazi and
Communist movements would never have been created had this worlc.
existed previously. The physical defeat of these movements was
a n: native necessity which would not lay a single cornerstone
of the new western world. America's task was to remain free of
the war fever which would corrupt its obligation towards the
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future
.
The publication in larch of 1940 of the papers of
Wccdr-cw Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, ^ave THE
_!E".7 REPUBLIC the opportunity to review the two Viorld Wars. The
magazine concluded that the chief difference in the American
position was that now the nation was shielded by neutrality
legislation which guarded against all the disputes with wi.ich
(
Lansing bed had. tc deal.
Perhaps the wisest safeguard Was the prohibition on
loans. The magazine said one of the chief lessons of the pa-
pers was the great unseen influence of the munitions industry irj
World War One. According to the papers, msny government offi-
cials had feared the country would suffer a major collapse un-
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less Allied wsr orders continued.
Invasion cf Scandinavia
In April the Germans struck into Scandinavia and the
so-called "phoney war" became very real on a new front.
To TEE NEW REPUBLIC the nev/ campaign ?/as another tra-
gic defeat ir the struggle for peace and democracy against to-
tali tariani'sm . Germany had shewed little respect for Norwegian
neutrality. And the Allies had adopted the totalitarian method
of reprisal by sowing mines In Norwegian waters. Thus they had
given the Germans the excuse for their long-planned invasion.
The magazine declared that the Allies had committed
a 7&ve crime if they had stimulated the German counter-measure
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without being prepared to stop it.
New Outlook
The German successes in Norway and Denmark made ne-
cessary a new outlook on the war. TEE NEW REPUBLIC magazine
for the first time was forced to consider the possibility that
the Allies might lose the war.
The editors did not believe thet a victorious Hitler
could invade the United States. But a dominant Germany could

take over the North and South American bases from which the
Nazis might strike at the United States.
As a consequence of Hitler victory, the United Spates
would become an armed camp in which progressive democracy would
be lost by the wayside as militarist methods were adopted by
the nation.
HoweA^er, it was felt that the United States could not
contribute enough in time to help the Allies win, should Ameri-
ca decide to enter the war. The neutrality legislation aided
the British blockade, the Allies had superior manpower and nava]
strength, and were receiving all possible equipment from Ameri-
.
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ca
.
The fact was, said the editors, even if it were de-
sirable to fight Hitler immediately, it would be fatal to enlist;
under the banner of the sluggish and incompetent ruling classes
of Britain and France. The editors said, ". . .for there is
no reason to believe that such leadership could win either a
,,143
war of a peace,
• Neville Chamberlain was the popular scapegoat of the
.
British disaster in Norway. However, said THE NEW REPUBLIC,
Chamberlain was but a symbol and a type. The real fault was
144
with a decadent ruling class.
And the magazine insisted thai; because the Allies
were in great danger of losing the war was no reason for a sud-
den reversal of the decision not to grant war credits. War
credits were seen dangerous in that they might help get the
V
nation into war by the back door, without anyone realizing it.
\
If Americans wanted the Allies bo win enough to riive them ammu-
1 45
nition, let them be courageous enough to do it openly.
Japan
The yesr 1940 was an elec ticn 'year, an election In
which Franklin D. Roosevelt was to run for a history-making
third term as President of the United States. Wt£b the Demo-
cratic convention looming in the near future the editors of
SHE NEYv REPUBLIC summarized and evaluated Roosevelt's second
term in a special section.
Hie editors concluded that American policy towards th^
war had been less interventionist than the President would have
liked and more interventionist than most of the American people
realized or would have welcomed if they had realized it.
In the Par iast, tLe magazine said, Americans were
closer to a conflict with Japan than they knew. Japanese spoke^
men had hinted that they might seize the Dutch East Indies if
Germany invaded Holland. The United States had politely in-
formed Japan of its opposition. If the United States was
dragged into war it vepy likely -would be through the Orient for
the purpose of preventing Japanese agression from going any
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farther than it had.
The same fear of a Japanese move towards the Indies
was repeated in the next issue. Hie magazine asserted that if
the Japanese fleet moved, probably the American fleet would
move also. Then came the prophetic statement: "In that case
i
( ll
the American public, trying to keep out of the European strug-
"1 ATI
;~le, might wake up to find this nation fighting elsewhere." x r'
Bases for Money
In June the magazine editors advocated a deal with
the Allies. The deal was designed to solve two problems - what
to do if the Allies ran out of money, and what to do if a vic-
torious Germany took over Bermuda, Jamaica, and British Guiana.
The editors' answer was that the United States should
buy all the British, French, and Dutch colonies in the Western
Hemisphere. The money would be used to purchase supplies in
the United States. Trie contract would permit repurchase by the
.... *4 M 148original owners after tne war.
Intervention vs. Isolation
The editors went on bo consider the foibles of the
two extreme views on America's position in the war. The inter-
ventionists were declared to be wron because they refused to
admit that the United States might not be able to save democra-
cy just by going to war.
The isolationists were wrong because America could
not be sure of remaining at peace merely by proclaiming it had
no intention of fighting. If the Allies surrendered, Hitler
would decide wnecher the United States must fight.
Democracy and War
Tne editors said the question Americans had to decide
was, which is the wisest way to defend the nation, and the best
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way of saving democracy at heme while arming against aggression
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Hie current; defeatist slogan that a democracy could
not win a war against a dictatorship was bitterly assailed by
'the magazine'. THE NEW REPUBLIC pointed to England and Prance
as proof of the exact antithesis. For these nations, the ma-
gazine said, had failed because they were led by conservatives
and anti -democrats who had exhibited their hostility to demo-
cracy at heme and abroad for years. At crisis after crisis -
Versailles, the Weimar Republic, tne League of Nations, the ap-
peasement of Hitler - it had been the Tories who had led Bri-
tain astray. And, said the magazine, it had even been the To-
ries who had failed tc rearm sufficiently cr to conduct tne war
with sufficient skill and resolution.
As for France, the enemies of democracy remained in
positions of power in the army and in politics.
THE NEW REPUBLIC took the stand: "Concentration of
command is, of course, necessary in a war. But not a blackout
of democracy. And no t a_ concen trs ticn of power in anti -demo -
era tic hands . (Italics in the original.) That way lies sure
defeat." 150
Partisan Non-Bel11gere'hey
Meanwhile, the German armies closed in on Paris, and
Italy declared war- on England and France. The collapse of Al-
lied resistance on the continent brought about a simultaneous
change in the policies of the United States and THE NEW REPUB-
LIC. The magazine hailed President Roosevelt's "stab in the
back" speech as the mark of the formal change of American pclicj'
V
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from cne cf neutrality tc cne of partisan non-belligerency.
Hie magazine rejected as cowardly and futile the pro-
posals that the United States appease Japan in the emergency
period. The editors could not conceive of a direct attack on
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America by Japen.
At the same time, the editors examined America's new
role
.
They said that America must not overlook one possible
means of helping the Allies. The present expense would seem in
significant compared with what might have to be spent later if
America faced Grermany alone. German victory would mean, at
best, an indefinite future cf militarized life. At the worst,
Americans would soon have to fight desperately for independence
The editors conceded a mistake in their previous
policy. They had realized the decadence cf the British and
French ruling classes, and bheir industrial unprsparedness
.
But wishful thinking had prevented the editors from realizing
that Hitler might smash Britain and France as easily as he had
Poland.
However, even with t2 is realization, the editcrs main
tained their position that the. United States should not enter
the war. American effcrts should be concentrated upon the de-
livery of every possible type of equipment tc the Allies. The
United States should organize chiefly to build up Allied might,
not its own. American defense must be improved, out not at the
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expense or the urgent needs cf the Allies.
¥
bl
In short, the editors' new policy could be summed up
in their own words: "~ive every possible aid to Britain snort
of war. In the meantime, prepare to defend as much of the
,154
Americas as possiole against any attack
•
A special section on national defense was publisned
in the issue cf July 1, 1^40. Contributing writers included
...ax Lerner, Fletcher Pratt, and editors C-eorge Soule and Bruce
Bliven
.
'Ihe ma ;;azine ' 3 own summary cf the special section
claimed the writers clearly snowed that the mosb important im-
mediate task of defense was to devote every possible effort to
155preventing the defeat cf Ire&t Britain.
The imminence of the nation to war caused a review of
the magazine's attitude toward American participation. Ihe edi-
tors thought that a real case could be made for American entry
into the first World ".ar, along with a better case for stsying
out of it. For the real case was not the one that the politi-
cians presented jbo the people. The politicians had succeeded
in making words like "democracy" and "cur brave Allies" dis-
tasteful to honest mcutns for a long time. The editors acknowl-
edged that they had never been doctrinaire pacifists, rather
their efforts to keep this country out of danger had been di-
rected towards keeping it from being tricked into war for other
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than compelling reasons of justice and survival.
Answer to Scbuman
The month of July brought a lecter from Professor

Frederick L. Schuraan -of Williams College urging that the United
States declare wer on Germany at once. To this THE NEW REPUBLIC
replied, "If it were reasonably certain that our belligerency
woul'i save Britain fvem conquest by Hitler, it would be almost
impossible to make a good case for remaining at peace." But,
insisted tine magazine, the critical period for Britain was a
matter of days. American armed forces could net help that
speedily. American efforts inus : concentrate on the immediate
tasK of supplying Britain. And should Britain emerge victorious,
the United States would be committed to war without any kncwl-
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edge of the peace aims.
In the meantime, the magazine did not lose si :ht of
the threat in the Orient. The editors wrote that it was no
secret that Japan Had Ion - desired to expel all the white men
out of the orient, and would try to do so as soon as she felt
,
J-Oo
strong enough.
The summer of 1940 saw the Presidential campaign
swinging into high gear as Roosevelt and Wendell Wllkie squared
off a sains t each other. 'The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC put
themselves on record in favor ol a third term for Roosevelt.
They said the President had many faults and chat they could not
call themselves devoted personal followers of his. Yet, they
sav/ in nim a symbol of a tendency in the national life which
they believed must be returned to power if the nation was to be
made ready to face its enemies. The editors stated that in no
country had a representative of business been able to organize
11
t
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the nation efficiently for war.
THE M5W REPUBLIC jumped eagerly onto the proposal tha{
America trade fifty over-a^e destroyers in return for leases
on British possessions in the Western Hemisphere. America did
not deed the destroyers; Britain did. And sending Britain the
destroyers mi ht save the United States billions of dollars in
the future. At any rate, the le&ses on the bases wei'e worth
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far mere bhan were the destroyers.
Editor George Soule appraised the magazine's foreign
policy in an article in August of 1^40. To Soule, the policy
he had helped to make had had two major errors in relation to
World V.ars Cne and Two.
'The first mistake had oeen to trust in the 1918 peace
aims of the victorious Allies. The other had been the failure
to realize that Hitler could win the second war, even though
the magazine had known of the decadence of Britain and Trance.
Soule wrote that the present policy of. the magazine
was : (1) the utmost possible help to Britain short of war,
(2) prompt organization of American defense, (5) refusal to
commit the nation to Help Britain win the war without a full
understanding about peace aims, (4) recognition that the only
world order in which the United States should become a partner
was one in which the economic, social, and political phases of
161
the democratic revolution were fulfilled.
THE NEW REPUBLIC next made a reluctant decision -
editorial support of conscription. The magazine quoted General
0(
»
George Marshall 1 s statement that the army needed a minimum of
1,200,000 men for defense. Ooviously, concluded the magazine,
that number of men could not be recruited. Conscription was the
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only answer. The naticn could not afford to gamble'
.
The ma razine took the occasion cf a communication from
its London correspondent, E.N. Brailsfcrd, to s cress its in-
sistence that the United States refrain from entering the war
yet. The editors said tha b not for a year would the country be
well enough prepared to ;ive Britain enough soldiers to count.
And Britain already was receiving everything else. Also, said
the magazine, the question of military aid could only arise af-
ter Britsin had fended off the invasion and America was ready.
. .we shall have to consider with
the utmost care the possible peace
aims and whether this nation ought to
commit itself to war in their behalf.
Fortunately, we may be able to maKe a
choice ins Lead of bein^ led by the-
pressure of events as v/e were in 1917."
The formation cf the Rome-Berlin-Tokio Axis in the
fail cf 1940 was taken by the magazine as an attempt to intimi-
date the United States. The magazine said the American answer
should be to cut off all shipments of oil to Japan and -ive far
1 64
more assistance to China. And the magazine lauded President
Roosevelt's radio statement that the United States refused to
be intimidated. TEE NEW REPUBLIC insisted:' "Japan is in re-
1 55
ality more afraid of us tnan v/e are of her."
-ore Aid
President Franklin D. Roosevelt won his third term
(*
(
fight in November and a short time later established his "rule
of thumb" for aid bo Engian&v But the rule of thumb was not
satisfactory to the editors of TEE NEW REPUBLIC. They wanted uc
know why the government did not hand over more than fifty per
i
cent of America's militarj" aircraft, and they urp;ed the govern-
ment to send Britain mere cver-a^e destroyers. The editors ar-
gued that aid to -^itain should be gauged by need, not by mess,
If America's first line of defense was not broken, the second
line migfet never have to be defended.
The editors foresaw a financial problem if Britain
continued to pay cash on the line. They decided it was better
to ...ake an outright ?ift of money to Britain rather than let
her borrow it. Surely, they said, American defense was worth
the expenditure of a oillion dollars for Britain. America
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could not permit Hitler to win.
In the Christmas issue of THE NEW REPUBLIC, the edi-
tors took a stand strikingly similar tc the one adopted in
February of 1917. The editors declared, "It is a waste of time
to ar^ue whether -the United States should enter the war. .'.e
are already in the war and have been for several years." And
they went on tc say, "In recent months our status has been
openly recognized as that of a non-belligerent ally of "reat
Britain. The one important oAuestion before us is hew to ma>;e
our cooperation most effective."
The editors advocated all possible aid even at the
risk of wrap, although they still felt it was tc Great Britain's
(
v
advantage for the United States to remain sz peace. In that
way supplies would not be diverted to a necessarily expanded
American military force.
British-American Alliance
And the editors returned to the idea of the first
editors of the magazine - the alliance of Britain and America,
hej urged the two nations to assume responsibility and leader-
ship for all of the non-totalitarian world. The new nations
should participate together in economic, industrial, and cul-
tural activities. Eri tish-Arneri can cooperation v/as seen as the
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alternative to Fascism.
Next, the editors took a cue from President Roosevelt,
falling in line with his fireside chafe asking war industries
to expand without reference to fear of excess capacity after the
crisis. Said TEE NEW REPUBLIC; "We must produce exactly as if
we were at war."
The magazine agreed with the President that if Bri-
tain was aided to the utmost, Americans might not ever have to
fight in World War Two.^°^
Ihe Battle of 1776
With the thought in mind that aid to Britain would
eliminate- the possibility of American participation in the war,
TBM NEW REPUBLIC endorsed the Lend-lease Bill, H.E. 1776, say-
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ing that it might oe the decisive action of the war.
Japan and Britain
That was in January of 1941. In February, tne ma xa—

87
zine "curned its attention cc the Pacific area. Japanese action^
were interpreted as an effort tc keep the American fleet in the
Pacific, and to prevent the government from transferring any
more. destroyers tc the British.
The magazine refused to bite. It insisted uhat if
Britain won the war, the United States certainly wculd have
little tc fear frcm Japan. The editors were confident that
Japan would bow down before a firm front; Japan would be ended
as a major power if Britain and the United States applied ecc-
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nomic pressure.
Naval Aid
Instead of asking for the weakening of American naval
power in the Atlantic, the editors called upon the government
to use its snips to patrol this side of the ocean. This would
release some British ships.
And if American naval vessels should spot a submarine
j
the editors saw no harm in flashing the news to the wide air
over tne snip's radio.
Close to '.«ar
The magazine continued on its path tc the ultimate -
war . The editors next urged uhe government to take steps to
protect war cargoes headed fcr Britain. Whatever steps were
necessary would be supported by the magazine.
The editors acknowledged that, fcJais mi^rht cause Hi tier-
to declare war. They answered that tihey did nbcfc believe he
wculd. If he did, he wculd only be dcinj; sooner what he un-
I
dcubtedly would do later. The editors declared,". . .the risk
is ins i rnifleant compared with the risk - to us of a British
defeat. .
They hoped that war would noo be necessary, but they
were sure that a war fought alongside of Britain was preferable
tc a lorie fight in the future. " . . .our endee is nob between
imperfect Britain and perfection; it is between imperfect Bri-
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tain and a Germany mere imperfect tc an indescribaole decree.
Public Opinion
THE rTEvY REPUBLIC had almost reached the point where
it was tc ask for war against aermany. 'Ihe editors knew it.
But, to tneir alarm, tney suddenly realized tna t the American
public had pro pressed as far toward war as they had.
'Ihe editors called this a ;reet danger. They pointed
out to Americans tl a t their navy patrolled the Atlantic giving
active aid to the British.
They told the public they should realize that hitler
»vas as determined to destroy , the United States as he was Bri-
tain. Ana tx called the unwitting allies of Hitler chose
business men who were holding back defense production by re-
sisting any plant expansion they did not think they could use
profitably after the emergency.
Ihe editors closed by saying tnat whatever needed to
be dene to ensure che saiecy of America ana to defeat fascism
throughout the world should be done regardless of any other
174
consequence
.
0
Trie Die Is Cest
On ti&f 23, 1941, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC
asked the United States take the offensive against Germany,
and bitterly regretted that the nation was not already taking
up amis •
On this date the editors assured their readers, "if
we do net fight new, it is absolutely certain that we shall havd
to fight later, at a time of Hitler's choosing, with a far small-
er probability that we shall be successful."
And they offered a program which they believed the
minimum necessary to save America. It called for American par-
ticipation with nil-land in a icint expedition to seize Dakar;
seizure of all the French islands in the Western Hemisphere;
protective occupation of the Azores, and the Cape Verde Islands
seizure of all the funcs of Axis powers in the United States;
the suspension of all diplomatic relations with the Axis na-
tions; and the use of the entire American fleet, if necessary,
to convoy military 8nd other supplies lc ~reat Britain.
Along with this the editors urged the government to
stop the appeasement of neutrals like Spain, to fire all fas-
cists and anti-semi tes in the State Department, and to start an
accive camps ign for the spread of democratic propaganda through-)-
out the world. 175
A few days later President Roosevelt proclaimed an
unlimited national emergency and pledged the delivery of Ameri-
can -made war materials to Britain. To THE NKW REPUBLIC the

President's action was a defiance cf Hitler, and wcuid almost
certainly lead to f i -hting within a few weeks or months. Trie
magazine was positive fetus President r>cw shared its belief that
it would be a wiser course to fight Germany at that point than
later. It was crucial that Britain remain standing. The pro-
spect of war was a horrible one, out not as terrible as the
prospect cf a world dominated by the Nazis.
The magazine asked, "Why play further cat and mouse
with the problem instead cf employing the sound strategy of the
, ]_7 5
offensive? This is cur hour cf* decision.
Two weeks later the magazine declared that only the
productive power and mcral energy cf the United States sbood
between hitler and world domination. And the editors new be-
came irked at President ; Roosevelt 's failure to act as swiftly
as they desired. They stated the President was loo much in-
fluenced by .the fact that the public still was unaware of the
danger inherent in a German conquest of Britain.
The editors called it an hour of desperate crisis.
'They said, "We implore the President to act and act at once."
And they presented another program which was essentially a call
for v/ar •
This program included the fullest possible use of the
navy in delivering more goods to England. The editors stated,
"If this means shooting, then shoot."
Tiien they asked that every particle of army equipment
which could be spared be sent tc British fences. They advecatec

also the reorganization of the nation's defense on an industri-
al basis, complete piice control, recognition cf air pov/er, and
the democratization of the State Department and elimination cf
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appessers
.
Way Out for Japan
Meanwhile, the magazine's attention was also focused
on the Far East. Secretary of State Full's letter to Doctor
Cue of China reminded the editors of their own proposals for
Asia. Hull bad expressed the same idea previously supported by
the magazine - that the United' States should lead the Vies tern
nations in ~,ivin
:3 up extraterritorial rights in China after the
war . The editors claimed it would show Japanese moderates
tnere was a way out which would save face. All nations should
be equal partners in the development cf the ~,reat Asistic main-
land.
At the same time, the editors wondered if such let-
ters were not meaningless. They referred to rumors that Ameri-
ca was contemplating a Far Eastern Munich. More appeasement,
they said, would, be intolerable. The arguments used to support
appeasement of Japan were characterized as ti.e same ones which
had been proven false in Europe.
The editors called for a strong and democratic China,
free of foreign domination and intervention, as the core of
American policy in the Far East. American sympathy for China
should be backed up with clear deed - 'an embar50 on oil and
copper to Japan and an increase in economic aid to China.
00
There were two important reasons, to THE NEW REPUBLIC,
why America had to help China more than ever. First a strong
China would be the most effective insurance against Japanese
domination of Asia, which consequently would mean the destruc-
tion of American post-war markets together with the strengthen-
ing of Hitler's world order. The second reason was ideological.
To abandon China was to betray democracy - to betray a nation
17a
in its great resistance lo rascist aggression.
As for the threat cf a twc -ocean war if .America was
involved with- Japan, TEE NEW REPUBLIC stated that the United
States could fight in twc ocesr.s as long as the British navy
were available to help. The real danger would come if the
United States 1st tne british go down and thus had to face the
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totalitarian wcrld alone.
Germany Invades Russia
The complexion cf trie war changed suddenly on June
22, 1941, when German troops launched an invasion cf Russia.
The course the American government snould t&Ae appeared clear
to TFE NEW REPUBLIC. Russia was now Hitler's enemy. If Hitler
j
defeated Russia, he then could turn on -n^land with security at
the rear. Therefore the United States must help Russia, not
fcr Russians sane, but for the best interests, of America.
And the editors stated flatly, "The time has now come,
in cur judgment, wren the* United States sbculd Immediately go
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to war with the Axis.
c
Second Front
Immediately, the magazine editors sought for the
method of making American power speak most effectively. First.,
the fleet should convoy ships carrying war supplies all the way
to British ports.
And, said the editors, there should be a seccnfl. front
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in Norta Africa.
The editors chafed at the bit as President Roosevelt
failed to move as swiftly as they desired. They applauded the
government for the occupation of Iceland and the sending of
troops to Trinidad and British Guiana: "The giant of the VJest-
ern world is at last reusing himself from his Ion-;, almost fatal
lethargy and is preparing to fight for his way of life. 11
to shooting when necessary. Therefore, even stronger actions
against 7-ermany would not necessarily in themselves brin 5 a
shooting war, since Hitler had not chosen to attempt reprisals.
The editors were convinced uhst the public was show-
ing itself ready for deeds of war if not for words of war."^°^
Crush Japan
At the same time, the editors called for strong ac-
tion against Japan, in order to eliminate the threat in the Pa-
cific. Tnen full attention could be brought on the European
battle scene.
Their criticism: these actions did not 50 far enoug
ir.ey pointed out that the nation already was committee
The editors claimed superior naval forces for the

Allied side. Japan would be crushed by these naval forces if
she decided to fi~ht.
But the Allies need not fight Japan to crush her.
The editors were convinced thai; a strict embargo would bring
t-'apan to ner Knees m a matter 01 months.
As history has shewn since, the under -es timati on of
Japan was the second strategical error of the editors. They
had already acknowledged their mistake in not realizing that
Termany could defeat the Allies.
Public Reluctance
'The editors of TEE NEW REPUBLIC had presumed that
altncu "h the Americsn people were somewhat tardy in realizing
their denser and tr. eir cblizaticns, all that was needed to
bring them around was time co adjust to fche situation. But in
August, the editors thO'U^nt they noticed a backward trend away
from accepting r espensibility
.
The blunt truth, they said, was that Americans were
trying to avoid what they realized was their duty.. They were
seekin3 to benefit from the fruits of a victory over Hitler
without doin~ their share to make the victory possible. They
were willing do sell their products to the Allies, but not
spend any manpower.
The editors declared Americans childishly dreamed of
a miracle whereby they would wake up one morning and find the
ivazis had been defeated without them having nad co make any
real sacrifices. Americans also hoped that the Russians would

be able to. dc their job for them.
To all this the editcrs said, "Either this is cur war
or it isn't." And they reaffirmed their conviction that this
we
s
America's war.
<
The editors blamed President Roosevelt fcr ohe inde-
cision of the American people. They said the President conceals,
important information from the public and shrank from telling
them of the dangers facing historic American principles. Since
the President did not want to be called a war-monger, TEE EEW
REPUBLIC su^ested a better term: truthmon jer , a mender of
specific facts.
Why Pi ;ht
The editors explained why they had decided America
should enter the war, instead of concentrating on being the
Allies' arsenal. They claimed a declaration of war wcuid be
effective new, since the problem was no longer the desperate
attempt to save the British Isles. There was now a chance to
defeat Hitler through the combined strengths of Britain, Russia
and the United States.
The editcrs argued that the declaration of war would
immobilize Japan. Japan would net dare to take cne step furth-
er as lon^ as there was a chance that C-ermany would be defeated,
According to TEE NEW REPUBLIC, the United States
could net achieve mcral integrity by waiting to be pusned into
war by a trick or an accident. The magazine prophetically
asked whether the American decision on s'o ^reat an issue,
f- .-_<._ .' v* • OT9UJ B Q - 15 1 ; ':
<
whether to tight now with Allies or have to fi^ht him alone
later, was to depend on a Japanese bend falling too close to
an American snip, or a reckless U-boat commander torpedoing
an American vessel instead of a British one.
No, answered the magazine. War was a job the people
should undertake deliberately by a free act of will in a case
where the national safety and future was endangered.
The best citizen, said the magazine, worked for a
world in which "war would be unnecessary. But, it was insisted,
sucn a world could net; exist with Hitler in it. And America
could not; wait until the Allied peace aims were more definite,
despite the betrayal of the first World War. The Atlantic Chart
er pointed the way. Americans must see to it that specific
peace aims were developed in the future.
But the first act must be a declaration of wsr on the
Axis. And the editors of USE KS1 R -PUBLIC , on Au-ust 25, 1941,
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asked the President for such a declaration.
TEE NE9B REPUBLIC sadly watched the reluctance of the
country to go to war at what trie magazine thought wa3 a golden
opportunity. The magazine foresaw a future in which the United
States would be surrounded by anti -democrat 3 . As a result, the
nation would have to be either permanently militarized or else
succumb to fascism. And the editors declared that each Ameri-
can who failed to use his personal pressure for war would share
the responsibility for future calamities.
Said the editors, "Cne mi "-tit excuse Chamberlain at
(%
Munich cn the -round that it was impossible tc foresee the
enormous successes of Hitler; but we nave had plenty cf warn-
„1S7
In ;s . '
Ultimatum zo Japan
THE HSU REPUBLIC also urged the State Department to
take decisive action in trie .Pacific. The ma :azine said in
articles in the issues of September 1 and October 20, 1943 , that
America must send Japan an ultimatum.
The ultimatum must threaten Japan with a shoo tin" war
unless she withdrew from China and Indo-China. The reward for
withdrawal from the Asiatic mainland would be the promise cf
an equal si-are in its development alon;: with European nations.
If Japan refused, Said the magazine, she would be
crushed by a severe economic blockade.
And if Japan resisted, the magazine relied on Dhe so-
called "competent military authorities" who said Japan could
not possibly ncld out against the Allies for more than a few
months
.
lc£
In October a Japanese spokesman hinted that Japan
might invade Siberia when she thought it safe to do so. THE
NEW REPUBLIC called for a joint declaration by Britain and the
United States that a Japanese move towards Siberia would bring
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imme di a t e war wi th tr e Alii e a •
And a week later, the ma ';azine was sure that the new
cabinet appointed in Japan was one which intended to strike if
thihgs went badly enough. A strong ultimatum by the United

States was needed. The editors were positive Japan would change
her policy if shown the error of her assumption that the United
States was bimorcus, vacillating and decadent.
At the same time, the American destroyer Kearny was
attacked by a German submarine. THE NEW REPUBLIC refused to
beat its breast in horror. The plain truth, said the magazine,
was that Germany and the United States were at war. And such
incidents were to be expected. The magazine hoped the attack
on the K earny would awaken some Americans to the national situa-
1?1
tion
.
War with the Axis
Once a ;3ain, the magazine repeated its demand for war
with the Axis. fll NSW REPUBLIC of November 10, 1941, said that
America had two ci-oices. She could wait meekly until her two
implacable enemies got ready to attack jointly. Cr si:e could
follow the common-sense procedure of disposing of tne weaker of
the two first, so she would be better prepared to meet the
tr.rsat of the otner. The magazine pointed cut that America had
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a two-ocean navy, half of it under the British flag.
Tne attempt to sink the r. earny was followed by the
torpedoing of tie destroyer Leu Pen James with Vae loss cf 76
lives. Congress responded by passing President Roosevelt's re-
quest for permission for American merchant skips to arm and en-
ter belligerent ports.
The reply of THE NEW REPUBLIC was the renewed insist-
ence that the time had come for war between America and Germany.

The magazine asserted chat a declaration of war would
aid the American effort to help the Allies in several v/a^s.
Japan would not be able to attack Russia in the rear. If Japan
fought she would be knocked out quickly, said the magazine. In
the meantime, Hioler could not strike at the United States.
The editors said a declaration of war would provide
the needed spark for increased production of war supplies. It
would destroy the business-as-usual philosophy.
Morale, both civilian and army, would be boosted.
And German spies and saboteurs could be dealt with effectively.
It wa3 obvious common sense, reiterated the editors,
to realize uhat even if Hitler did not intend to destroy the
United States, the nation could not live as a democratic island
193
in a fascist world.
Hull-Kurusu
In the closing days cf Novemoer the Japanese envoy
Kurusu and Secretary cf State Gordell Hull conferred on the
growing crisis between the two countries.
The editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC stated that
s
these ne-
^otiacicns were useless. To jo and Togo, the Japanese Premier
and his Foreign Minister, had blocked the way to a successful
understanding by speeches delivered as Kurusu arrived in Washin:
ton. The editors said these speeches were an ultima cum to the
United States to recognize the .Japanese conquest of China. The
ultimatum must be refused.
Instead, che eciCcrs criticized what they called the
I
meekness of the State Department. They said that the govern-
ment should have already sent final and drastic American terms
to Japan and should have demanded an immediate decision. Ameri
can oerms would be simple: Japan must leave the Axis, with-
draw- from China and every country she had invaded, and try to
behave like a civilized nation in the future. Any American
'agreement to anything less, the editors said, would constitute
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an inexcusable and disastrous Ear Eastern repetition of Munich.
On December first, the editors declared that America
wcuid betray China by any compromise with Japan. For China be-
lieved herself part of the world democratic front.
The editors advised the government to take advantage
of Kurusu's presence in Washington. Ee should be informed 1 that
any attempt by the Japanese army to sever China's lifeline,
either at Kunming or in Burma itself, would be viewed by Bri-
195
tain and the United States as an act of war.
Pearl F arbor
December 7, 1941 was as feig a shock to THE ¥£". RE-
PUBLIC as to the most complacent American, in spite of the fact
the magazine realized all alcn*, as few Americans did, that
Japan and the United States were close to v/ar . Evidently the
men who bombed Pea?l Harbor were net as convinced as THE NEW
REPUBLIC of the inevitability of s swift American victory.
In the already published issue of December b, the
magazine crowed over what ib called good news from every front
of the world war. The Germans were bein-< driven from Rostov

by the Russians and the British had. penetrated well into Libya.
JEB NEW REPUBLIC declared, "i;o doubt these events affected the
Japanese decision not to start a war with the United States. . .
at least not yet." 1 ^
That issue was full of statements calculated to make
the blushing editors wish they could call it back before it hit
the news stands. The ma -azine had declared that it agreed with
a Roosevelt statement made before he became President in which
he said there could hardly be a war between Japan and the United
States because neither could a;et at the ether to fi^ht it.
If there was a war, the magazine predicted it would
consist of limited naval fighting^ perhaps some jungle warfare
in Malaya or Burma, but mainly it would consist of a process of
economic strangulation which Japan would have little chance of
arres tin^
.
Would Japan figbttf The magazine thought it possible
that the stories cf the mystic belligerence ci Japan's military
caste might be true. In which case, Japan might fight to save
face
.
However, the editors said, "Unless there is seme un-
likely error in our information about tne naval situation, sane
strategists would never permit Japan to start such ,a hopeless
war .
As for Lhe United States, the editors were convinced
that it would never act unless Japan struck first.
But the editors did feel that Japan would never yield
%4
4
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to the United states without armed resistance. They said both
nations were gambling by waiting for the outcome of the European
war
.
"Therefore," said THE NETS REPUBLIC,
"we should have no ~reat cause for
regret if Japan decided to resist
now. rcr the more she resists, the
mere quickly will she exhaust her re-
serves of material, and her menace
might be eliminated in time to allow
us to concentrate all our power in^
the final struggle with Hitler." 1^
.Var
All was changed when the next issue came cut, on
December 15, 1941. The confidence in a quick victory for the
United States had been destroyed alon^; with part of the American1
fleet lying on its side at Pearl Harbor. Tne magazine recog-
nized the success cf the Japanese naval blow in equalizing
Pacific naval strength.
But the ma gazine was 3 bill sure bhab America had to
.
win in the lon^ run. Japan's strategy obviously was based upon
a short campaign.
And the editors ruefully admitted the Japanese attrck
should net have come as a surprise to supposedly intelligent
men
The editors saw the Pacific war as pert of a strategic
whole with Piurcpe. Ib was bein \ said throughout the country by
large groups that Americans must not ferret her real enemy was
Hitler. THE NEW REPUBLIC flatly stated this oc be untrue. rIhe
real enemy was che coalition arrsyed against the United States.

Whether America concentrated first on defeating Japan or on de
198 'feating Hitler was purely a matter of strategy. ^

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
There are strii^in^ similarities between the attitudes
of TEE NEW REPUBLIC to #orld v.'ars One and Two. The magazine
editors favored peace, out not a peace at any price. Some
things, they said, are worth fighting for.
Basically, their final interventionist positions were
caused by a determination that Germany should not defeat Bri-
tain. The editors called it "protecting America's national in-
terests." To them, the advancement of the nation's interests
was the only valid reason for going to war.
And it v/as their contention in World War One that
America's future lay in an alliance with Britain as the only
other nation witn common interests and culture. The editors
said the British navy was America's first line of defense.
This same feeling carried over into World War Two.
But the editors could not conceive at first of a German victory
For thac reason they were perfectly willing that Britain fight
without United States aid, even though they felt that England
fought America's war.
TEL REPUBLIC never was neutral in either war.
Neither was the United States, and the magazine recognized that
fact. In the first war, the editors declared neutrality im-
moral when one cf the warring powers was the nation which had
invaded Belgium and was turning the seas into a highway of hor-
ror. The magazine called for benevolent neutrality - favorable
\
tc the Allies. In 1939, the editors insis ced immediately on al]
possible aid to Britain Chat would not involve the United states
in the war. Die editors called for amendment of the Neutrality
Acts to permit cash-and-carry trade, a trade which would benefii
Britain as the mistress of the seas.
Then step by step they progressed towards advocacy of
a shooting war. The magazine became mere and more desperate as
Germany rolled thrcu'jh JLurcpe . With Britain facing invasion
and complete defeat, THE NETS REPUBLIC could hold back no longer
The editors asked that the United Stages declare war on Germany
In the second war, the editors were much more posi-
tive and Aggressive in their interventionist attitude. A re-
view of differences in ideas between 1914 and 1959 will show
wLy the magazine adopted a war psychology more quickly in World
•Aar TV/c
.
The editors feared the Nazis as .they never were afraic
of the Kaiser. It was only in the height of the war fevei in
1917 that the ma3azine was able to convince itself that the
kaiser's Germany was after world conquest.
However, Hitler was another story. The editors in-
sisted from the first that world domination was Hitler's rjcal
.
The Uni cad States would have to fight the Nazis some day, and
if Britain were defeated, the United States v/ould face alone
what would be the greatest military power on tie earth. The
editors declared that America could net aficrd 'cc lose the pro-
tection of the British navv in the Atlantic.

Neutral rights were a tremendous issue bo the editors
in tLe first war. They demanded bha b the United States vi^orousl
ly pretest violations of freedom of the seas by bobh sides.
However, the editors said the United States could not make more
than strong verbal pretests to Britain. For the British olock-
ade must net be hampered. It was his strict insistence upon
enforcing neutral rights', and therefore hindering the British
war effort, that led the magazine to declare itself against the
presidential candidacy of Charles Evens Hughes.
On the other hand, the magazine criticized the United
States for what it called, at first, weak handling of the sub-
marine situation.
The editors realized that because of their vulnera-
bility and limitations, submarines could nob observe the inter-
national requirements of warnings before the use of torpedoes,
and coming to the aid of passengers on sinking vessels. But,
said the editors, anarchy on the seas cannot be permitted.
Because of submarine warfare and the clumsy diplomacy
of the German government, EES NEW b "-.PUBLIC declared neutral
rights were mere safely entrusted to Britain. The editors felt
sure that Britain would live up to her responsibilities as soon
as the pressure was off.
Tne second war did not see sucJr a concern for neutral
rights. Ihe Neutrality Laws, favored by the magazine, were in-
tended to keep Americs out of war by keeping American ships out
of the danger spots, and. banning tne munitions trade. Ehus

actually the United States had abandoned some of the rights for
which she claimed she fought in lcI7.
All through the war- years of 1915-17, THE NEW REPUB-
LIC clamored for both belligerents to declare their war aims.
The editors were supporters of a lejague of peace. It was be-
cause of the les~ue of peace idea that the magazine swung to the
side of President vvocdrcw Wilson after early criticisms of him.
In fact, it was because it seemed that an Allied victory would
insure the establishment of a league to enforce peace that the,
magazine finally was able to tell itself that the Allied cause
was the just fight. Per this would be a war in keeping with
American national interest if it could be turned into a war to
secure a stable and peaceful world.
But, the editors could not conceive of a stable world
without Germany and Russia as equal partners in it along with
other nations. Thus the Treaty of Versailles was taken as a
betrayal of the liberal cause since it seemed to promise a wesk
and subjected Germany at the mercy of France. And the Imperi-
alist attitudes of the Allies after the war resulted in the dis-
illusionment of the editors. They said the League of Nations
was a sham, designed to preserve one status quo.
Consequently, THE NE1 REPUBLIC did not stress war
aims as much In its discussions of World Asr Two. Promises
made under pressure by unwillinx Allies could not de depended
upon. It was mere important to defeat the Nazis.
Before 'coming cut for American entrance into the war

10c
in 1941, THE N3W REPUBLIC never fccled itself intc the idea
that the peace settlement v/culd solve basic preblgma
•
In the first war, one of the xaajjazine's reasons for
its first attitude cf abstention from fightfj&g was to preserve
a sane level of tnoudjt in America. Hie United States must sit
at the peace table without any feelings of hate which would be
the natural outcome cf participation in oattle. In the postwar
years, fch$ editors often rued the naivete whicn had led them to
expect one imperialist leopards to change Lheir spots.
The second World War was complicated by the Japanese
factor. The editors had Japan pe^ed correctly, but did not
fellow through to the lo~ical conclusion. They knew Japan was
controlled by a militarist clique which was out to rule Asia
and would strike at Thailand or the Netherlands Sast Indies
wnen it was seemed 3afe to do so.
The editors insisted that the United States must net
yield one inch to Japan. The editors said the United States
must order Japan out of the Asiatic mainland, then a benevolent
America should invite Japan to share as an equal partner in the
development of China.
The editors could not conceive tnat Japan could ouck
the United States even ohou^h they realized the preoccupation
of the Nipponese warlords witn saving face. The editors made
a basic error in military strategy. Just as they misjudged the
strength of Fitler's armies, they miscalculated the striking
power of Japan against a dormant United States navy.

Because of America 1 s, supposed naval and economic su-
periority, the editors cf HEE NSW REPUBLIC aaid Japan would be
foolish tc engage in a war which would see it crushed by Ameri-
ca in a few mcnths . In fact so sure were the editors of this,
they wrote that they almost wished Japan would fight sc that one
Axis partner could be eliminated.
The editors cf THE NEW REPUBLIC realized in 1939 that
America mi gilt enter the war through Asia quicker than through
Europe. Yet the actual outbreak cf war cau -;ht them flatfccted.
Their issue distributed the day after Pearl Harbor spoke smugly
of Japan's reluctance to force the issue with the mighty United
States .
Conclusion
lb sum up, the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC were not
neutral in either world Viar Cne or Yv'orld Y/ar Two . In the first
war, despite their early insistence that tne United States should
not participate in the fighting, the editors supported a policy
of oenevolent neutrality. It was their oelief that the United
States should do nothing to harm the British war effort. The
editors of 1939 did net have any cf the early attempts at non-
partisanship of 1914: they immediately called for amendment cf
the Neutrality i_.aws to aid Britain. From there they v/ent on to
the destroyers-deal, lend-lease, and a shooting naval convoy.
In both wars, the editors were convinced that a Bri-
tish victory was for the best interns is of the United States,
ihey were positive that a Hiuler victory over oritain means
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that the United States would later have to fight Germany with-
out allies. So, as in 1917, the editors called for war with
Germany
.
j-he excesses of German submarine warfare paved the
way emotionally for the editors' 1917 decision. Rationally,
they said, the league of peace was a geal worth fighting for.
however, the period from 1918 to 1959 saw the editors
disillusioned in their hopes for a stable wcrld peace.
As s result, their pro-Allied attitude in the second
war was based, upon what the editors thought was strict calcu-
lation of what; was oest for America. Share was a notable ab-
sence cf any ":cal except self-preservation.
With German armies threatening to leap across the
English Channel, the editors admitted their early insistence
that the United States need not fight was based upon their un-
derestimation cf German strength, and Allied weakness. Had
these things been realized, the editors would have called for
war as soon as 0-ermany invaded Poland.
Between 1939 and 1941, the editors cf TEE IM REPUBLIC
just about invited a Japanese attack. They ur^ed the American
government to adept a firm unyielding attitude towards <Japan.
So sure were the editors of American superiority, they would
not let themselves see that Japan might make a desperate lun^e
to free herself of the threat of what she considered a domineer-
ing United States. The editors were just as complacent about
America's supposed military strength as was the public. Both
(I
were shocked by Pearl Harbor
.
HIE NiHS REPUBLIC'S role as a leader of liberal thought
differed in both wars. In the first conflict, the magazine
came around to intervention much later than did most sc-cslled
liberals. Indeed, the editors several times had to defend them-
selves against charges of pro-Germanism.
However in the second war, the magazine was ahead of
many liberals. Despite ius early statements that American ar-
mies were not needed, the magazine was always prepared for a
shooting war the minute Iz could be shown that Britain could
not defeat Germany in any other way. And the magazine was cer-
tainly well ahead of the general public which remained oblivious
tc the danger of war ri ght up to Pearl Harbor.
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INTRODUCTION
Purpose
THE NEW REPUBLIC was born as a "journal of opinion,"
and that opinion is ranged with the progressive forces in Ameri-
can political and intellec&ual life. It was the purpose of
this thesis to examine the attitudes of this liberal journal to-
ward the two great wars in which the United States has partici-
pated in recent history. The study traced the steady change in
attitudes which finally led the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC to
advocate United States entrance into the two world wars
.
method
This work made use of primary sources, the issues of
the magazine itself. And the chronological method was adopted
in order to present a whole picture of the development of atti-
tudes toward several issues at the same time.
In World War Cne THE NEW REPUBLIC early rejected iso-
lation. Like most Americans, the editors favored peace. They
called non-resistance a negative attitude. To them, true paci-
fism was not mere moral refusal to have anything to <3c with war,
but the effort to build a world in which war would not be neces-
sary. Thus they were among the first advocates of a league of
nations; the term they used was "a league to enforce peace."
The editors early recognized that neutrality, in the
real sense of not helping one side more than the other, was

impossible, both from a moral and practical point of view,
morally, they considered it reprehensible for a nation to claim
neutrality in a case of aggression, such as the German invasion
of Belgium. Practically, there was the problem of neutral
rights. German submarines wer ~ creating anarchy cn the high
seas. The British alsc infringed upon American rights. The
United States pressed its pre bests against submarine warfare
wi ich was taking lives. But it wss obvious that the United
States would never get beyond polite words in its protests to
Britain. If the United States were to break the British block-
ade it wculd help Germany, and chat was undesirable. It would
also mean a fi~ht against British sea pewer, and the editors
were advocates of a future alliance between Britain and Americs
as two -^reat nations with a community of interests. The edi-
tors would not favor any conflict with British naval power
which they regarded as the first line of American defense.
The magazine care out for "benevolent neutrality," a
neutrality which favored the Allies as non-a3sresscrs and de-
fenders of the "Atlantic world," the civilization of which the
United States was a part.
However, Germany was not to be excluded in the future
from her ri fitful place as a member of that Atlantic world.
The magazine never accepted the thesis of exclusive' German war
.guilt, nor did it overlook the sins of Czarist ?us:3ia, or im-
perialist Britain or France. The magazine insisted upon "peace
witr.cut victory." The peace must be negotiated, not dictated
9I
'
by a conqueror, even if trie Allies were victorious, .cor there
could be nc stable peace if a crushed Germany were excluded
from the lea rue of peace. The league must not be an organiza-
tion to preserve tiie new status quo, to keep Germany down.
The editors had begun by criticizing President Wilson
for his birnid neutrality. However', they swung; to his side as
he made it obvious he intended to do nothing to harm the Bri-
tish cause. As a result, trie magazine worked for Wilson ! s re-
election in 1916, opposing- Hughes because his insistence on
strict impartiality would lead to the breaking of the British
blockade of Germany and aid the German war effort.
THE NEW REPUBLIC took every possible occasion to re-
cord itself in favor of the Allied cause. But for a lon~ time
it could not find a good reason for military participation.
Nevertheless, the German submarine warfare was pushing it and
tne United States toward a choice. TS.^ NEW REPUBLIC felt that
the only possible excuse for America to fight -would be for the
cause of world peace. But the United States could not be sure
that a 3ood peace would result from the war unless the belli-
gerents accepted the principle of a league cf peace.
The Allies seemed to accept the league, whereas the
Germans were unwilling to make the league a pre-requisi te to
negotiations
.
So THE NEW REPUBLIC, sparked emotionally by the ex-
cesses of submarine warfare, solved its dilemma of how to choose
between two causes wnen the side it favored did net have entire-
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ly clean hands. The magazine decided that it was in the Ameri*-
can interest to fight for a league of peace. American partici-
pation would give the nation the right to speak for liberalism
at the peace table.
When Germany announced the resumption of unrestricted
submarine warfare on January 51, 1917, the magazine replied the
next day that the United States must break off diplomatic re-
lationships and prepare for war. Articles in the following
weeks attempted to prepare America by insisting that the United
States already was at war through its policy of benevolent neu-
trality.
TEE NEW REPUBLIC had jumped on the Wilson bandwagon
when he made his own the fight for a league of peace. And when
Wilson took the United States into war after continued German
submarine action, THE NEW REPUBLIC was prepared to follow the
man the.y new celled a great leader, in his efforts for world
peace
.
The post-war settlement brought bitter disillusion-
ment to the Editors of THE NEW REPU3LIC. They criticized the
Treaty of Versailles as a product which revesled the basic im-
perialist intentions of its makers. Tr,ey said there could not
be any stable peace unless Germany, Russia, and China were full
members of the family of nations. They attacked the League of
Nations because of its link with the Treaty.
In the 1950' s Hitler was rising to great power, and
i
Americans were thinking how to avoid being drawn into the next
•
war. Cut of tnis came the ^autrality Acts, designed to keep
America frcm making the same mistakes which had helped push it
intc the first World War. TH.i MSI REPUBLIC approved the Neu-
trality Laws, but the' editors did not oelieve bhat the laws
should be enforced against tie Spanish Loyalists.
With the German invasion cf Poland in 1939 and the
resulting outbreak of world war, the magazine immediately placec
its support on the Allied side. She ef.itors instantly called
upon Congress to permit cash-and-carry trade with belligerents
This would be legally neutral, although in practice it would
favor critain, the great ssa power.
The editors refused to make this war an Ideological
conflict. They pointed out that the previous war had shown thatj
evil could not be eradicated by fighting. The only justifica-
tion for war was self-defense. The editors did say that there
wa3 enough right on the Allied side to warrant American action
towards repealing the arms emosrgo.
The magazine editors did net have any confidence in
the democratic intentions cf the leaders of France and Britain,
ihe conservative 1 eadershipsof those countries were character-
ized as decadent, anti -democratic, and incompetent.
THE . ; EH EH PUBLIC claimed Allied defeats were not
caused by failure to adept efficient totalitarian metneds, but
rather througn the failure to adopt real democratic methods.
However, the editors much preferred the Allies to the
l:azis . Acccrdin-', to the magazine, the fact that Hitler denied
*
*
any intentions of ever harming tie United Stakes was proof that
the opposite was true. The editors wrote chat appeasement of
Hitler had failed because his ambitions were limitless. And
they declared thai, if Hitler defeated England, it would only be
a matter of time before the United States had to defend itself.
'Hie editors knew Germany could net invade the United States.
But, j tney said, Germany could obtain the necessary springboard
bases on the American continent.
Meanwhile, the editors warned that war might come
quicker to America from Asia than from Europe. They insisted
the United States order Japan out of China and threaten her with
economic boycott. They were sure that Japan v/ould hav e to bow
to economic sanctions. Japan's only alternative would be a
desperate war which, the editors thought, she could not possibly
win
.
On the other hand, the editors urged the United States
to offer Japan a v/ay out. Tne United Stabes should lead the
white nations in wi thcix-awing from China. Then Japan should be
invited to share equally in the development of the Asiatic
mainland.
The success of the German invasions cf Scandinavia,
and then France and the lov; countries, shocked TriE NE$f KLf^UBLIC.
For the first time, the editors realized that the Allies could
lose the war.
And they declared that the United States could not
let England go down. England, they said, was the first line of

defense of America. Without England the United States would oe
a democratic island in a hostile German world. The defense of
England wss the defense of America.
The editors then celled upon America to .^ive Britain
all possible help - arms, snips, all equipment which could be
spared. The editors supported the gift of the over-age destroy-
ers and. wanted even more destroyers to be sent.
However, the .ua^azine did not want the United States
to 30 to war. The equipment and training of an American army
would take up too much time before the army could be of any use.
And supplying this army would deprive England of needed weapons.
Tfte major task of the nation was to be the "arsenal of demo-
cracy." And at the same time, the government should embark on
a defense program planned so that it would not interfere with
the supply line to England.
Another reason for not entering the war was to keep
clear of European entanglements. It was not yet certain what
the war was about except to defeat Hitler. And it was not
clear yet that even the participation of America would insure
Hitler's defeat.
In the next months, the editors advocated American
navy convoys for ships in the zone close to America, the arming
of merchant vessels, lend-lease, and the destroyers -fcr-bases
deal. Whatever it ccst to save Britain then would save the ex-
penditure of much more money in a future war.
The editors called upon the President to use the Amerilf-
•
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can navy to patrol the American coastal waters in order to re-
lease more British shipping. Then the magazine decided that
American ships should go all the way to British ports, and if
that meant shooting, it was all right by the editors.
The German invasion of Russia seemed to be a great
opportunity to the magazine. Germany now was fighting on anoth-
er front; Russia must be aided.
The German-Russian war brought about the great deci-
sion of the magazine. The United States should fight Germany.
For the time had come, the editors said, when American entrance
could win the war for the Allies. Ruissia kept Germany busy on
one front, and if Germany wen cut there, England would suffer.
For Hitler could turn his back on Eastern Europe.
The magazine now called for a second front : American
armed forces should join the British in an invasion of North-
Africa .
THE NEW REPUBLIC had made up its mind early in the
summer of 1941, but the American public was not ready. So the
editors fretted as President Roosevelt delayed making what
seemed to the editors the obvious decision.
The* magazine turned its attention to Japan. The
editors decided the united States must call Japan's bluff and
eliminate her from the Axis. The editors did not believe Japan
would fight. If she did, the fight would be welcomed; then the
United States would crush her quickly and turn on Germany with-
out any worries about the Pacific.
•
However, the editors cf THE NEW REPUBLIC were as vmci
surprised as anyone by the Pearl Harbor attack. The issue of
December 6, 1941, was full cf optimism oased upon the Russian
victory at Rostov and British successes in Libya. Surely the
Japanese would not dare resist new. The next week the editors
adjusted quickly to the outbreak cf war and were ready for the
crusade against the Axis.
CONCLUSION
A review of the magazine's attitudes towards World
Wars One and Two shews the editors were net neutral in 3Ithe
r
conflict. Their basic policy was the advancement of American
interests. And they thought it was in the American interest
in each case that England should net be defeated by Germany.
In the first war the establishment cf a league of peace seemed
more likely with an Allied triumph. In the second war, a Ger-
man victory seemed uo threaten the future security of uhe Unitec.
States which would become, the editors thought, a democratic
Island in a fascist world.
J
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